EGAS

The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"

Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study For QWESNA Pressure Reduction Station

Prepared By
Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company
PETROSAFE

March 2022

Title	Quantitative Risk Assessment Study for Qwesna New & Existing Pressure Reduction Station – Monufia Governorate
Customer	Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"
Customer Reference	EGAS/QRA/02/2015-MG/MS
Confidentiality, Copyright and Reproduction	This document has been prepared by PETROSAFE in connection with a contract to supply services and is submitted only on the basis of strict confidentiality. The contents must not be disclosed to third parties in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Report Number	EGAS.HSE.QRA.Study.016/Qwesna-Egypt.Gas/PRMS.No.003/2019/QRA/MG/MS/WS-DNV-PHAST.7.21/UAN.154,620-PETROSAFE-Final.Report-Rev.05
Report Status	Revision - 05

PETROSAFE
6w/4 Hassan Nassar St. - Takseem El-Laselky - New Maadi, Cairo, Egypt
Telephone: +(202) 2517 6935 / 2517 6936 / 2517 6937
Facsimile: +(202) 2517 6938 / 2517 6958
e-mail: mohamed.ghazaly@petrosafe.com.eg
mohamed.samy@petrosafe.com.eg

	Name	Signature	Company	Date
Team Work	Chem. Wael Saied Assistant GM – Dafety Department		PETROSAFE	17/03/2022
	Chem. Mohamad Samy Safety Consultations Assist. GM		PETROSAFE	17/03/2022
	Geo. Mohamad Al-Ghazaly Saf. & Env. Consultations GM		PETROSAFE	17/03/2022
Reviewed by	Dr. Emad Kilany Safety General Manager		EGAS	/03/2022
	Eng. Ahmad Farag World Bank Project General Mgr.		EGAS	/03/2022
Approved by	Dr. Ashraf Ramadan Assistant Chairman for Environment and Supervising on Health & Safety Department		EGAS	/03/2022
	Eng. Ahmed Mahmoud Vice Chairman for Planning & Gas Projects & Buisness Devt.		EGAS	/03/2022

Distribution

- Client: EGAS
- File: EGAS / PETROSAFE
- Library: EGAS / PETROSAFE

CONTENTS

Figures

Executive Summary

This report summarizes the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) analysis study undertaken for the New and Existing Natural Gas Pressure Reduction & Metering Station "PRMS" with Odorant at Qwesna City – Monufia Governorate – Egypt. The PRMS owned by The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS" and operated by Egypt Gas Company.

The scope of work includes performing frequency assessment, consequence modeling analysis and Quantitative Risk Assessment of Qwesna PRMS in order to assess its impacts on the surroundings.

The main objective of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study is to demonstrate that Individual Risk "IR" for workers and for public fall within the ALARP region of Risk Acceptance Criteria, and the new Qwesna PRMS does not lead to any unacceptable risks to workers or the public.

QRA Study has been undertaken in accordance with the methodology outlined in the UKHSE as well as international regulations and standards.

QRA starts by Hazard Identification (HAZID) study, which determines the Major Accident Hazards (MAH) that requires consequence modelling, frequency analysis, and risk calculation.

In order to perform consequence-modelling analysis of the potential hazardous scenarios resulting from loss of containment, some assumptions and design basis have been proposed. Three scenarios of the release have been proposed:

1. Gas Release from the inlet / outlet pipeline.
2. Gas Release from the off-take point.
3. Leak from odorant tank.

The QRA has been performed using DNV Phast software (Ver. 7.21) for consequence modelling of different types of hazardous consequences.

Weather conditions have been selected based on wind speed and stability class for the area detailed weather statistics.

The average weather conditions have been selected, represented by wind speed of 4.6 m/s and stability class "D" representing "Neutral" weather conditions, in order to obtain conservative results. The prevailing wind direction is North & North West (NW).

Additional scenario was discussed to highlight the effect of different weather conditions "low wind speed", where the differences between the two weather conditions was negligible. Please refer to Annex "1" for additional scenario.

As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario, the following table summarize the analysis as follows:

Event	Scenario	Effects
Pin hole (1") gas release 6" inlet pipeline (Existing PRS)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching the new PRS facilities down and crosswind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*The modeling shows that the all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary covering some of new PRS facilities down and crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Half rupture (3") gas release 6" inlet pipeline (Existing PRS)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to cover the new PRS facilities and reaching the admin office downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*The modeling shows that the values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m² will extend outside the PRMS eastern fence down and crosswind. The value of 12.5 kW/m² will cover the control room downwind and reaching the heater crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
Full rupture gas release 6" inlet pipeline (Existing PRS)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (UF, LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend over eastern fence and covers the PRMS new facilities and control room downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the eastern fence covering the admin and security offices and reaching Sharanis road downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS covering the outside roads and reaching the poultry farm SW side.* *The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will cover the control room and extend outside the PRMS from east and west sides.*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*N/D*
Pin hole (1") gas release 8" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary. The 4 & 9.5 kW/m^2 values will be near to the heater crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
Half rupture (4") gas release 8" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the admin and security offices downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the PRMS SE fence downwind. The value of 12.5 kW/m^2 will cover the heater crosswind and reaching the offices downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Full rupture gas release 8" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (UF, LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend over SE corner and covers the PRMS offices down and crosswind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the SE fence covering the admin and security offices and Sharanis road down and crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS covering the outside roads and reaching the poultry farm SW side.* *The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS from E & W sides and covers the PRMS offices.*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*N/D*
Pin hole (1") gas release 10" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with no effects inside.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value 1.6 & 4 kW/m² effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary downwind with no effects.* *The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m² not determined by the software due to small leakage.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Half rupture (5") gas release 10" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (UFL, LFL & 50% LFL) will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching admin and security offices downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m² will extend outside the PRMS east fence covering the admin office and near to the security office downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Full rupture gas release 10" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the heater section.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that all heat radiation values will extend outside the PRMS SE boundary down and crosswind covering the admin and security offices and reaching Sharanis road.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides and will be near to Sharanis road.* *The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and covering the control room.*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 will cover the PRMS components and extend outside from three sides (N, E &W).* *The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with some extension from west side with no effects.*
Odorant tank 1" leak		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will extend inside the PRMS boundary reaching control room crosswind.* *Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that all values of heat radiation (9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the PRMS boundary down and some extension crosswind (9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2).* *The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will be near to the control room and downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS boundary from E & W sides with no effects down or upwind and reaching Sharanis road south side.* *The values of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS covering the heater and extend some meters outside from east side.*
Pin hole (1") gas release 8" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 4 & 9.5 kW/m2 will be limited inside the off-take boundary.* *The values of 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m2 not determined by the software as it is very small values.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
Half rupture (4") gas release 8" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 will extend outside the off-take boundary from all sides reaching (1.6) Sharanis road north side.* *The values of 9.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the off-take boundary.* *The values of 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 not determined.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Full rupture gas release 8" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend outside the off-take point with no effects downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the off-take boundary from southeast side downwind with no effects down or crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will reach the PRMS north side and poultry farm west side.* *The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will extend outside the off-take point reaching Sharanis road north side.*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*N/D*

The previous table show that there are some potential hazards with heat radiation resulting from jet fire, and overpressure waves in case of gas release and early ignited.

The major hazards that extend over site boundary and/or effect on workers / public were used for Risk Calculations.

Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is an analysis technique for identifying and evaluating the sequence of events in a potential accident scenario following the occurrence of an initiating event. ETA utilizes a visual logic tree structure known as an event tree (ET). ETA provides a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the risk associated with each potential outcome. ETA has been used for scenario development.

The following data and assumptions have been considered in the Event tree analysis (ETA):

- Failure frequency data (mainly E&P Forum/OGP),
- Risk reduction factors (if available),
- Ignition probabilities (both immediate and delayed),
- Vulnerability data.

Risks have been assessed for workers / public using International Risk Management Guidelines as a reference.

The resulting risks have been compared with International Risk Acceptance Criteria.

Risk evaluation for Individual Risk "IR" for the major hazards presented in the following tables:

Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the Off-Take

Event	Scenario	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas release from 8" off-take point	Explosion	Outdoor	***2.11E-09***	Acceptable (√)
TOTAL Risk for the Public (Off-Take Point)			***2.11E-09***	**Acceptable (√)**

Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for PRMS Workers

Event	Scenario	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas Release from 4"/8" inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	***2.28E-05***	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 3"/6" inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	***2.92E-06***	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 6" inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	***1.51E-07***	Acceptable (√)
	Explosion	Indoor	***1.36E-06***	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 8" inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	***1.94E-07***	Acceptable (√)
	Explosion	Indoor	***3.87E-07***	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 10" outlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Indoor	***6.45E-08***	Acceptable (√)
	Explosion	Indoor	***3.87E-07***	Acceptable (√)
TOTAL Risk for Worker (PRMS)			***2.83E-05***	**ALARP**

Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the PRMS

Event	Scenario	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas Release from 6" inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Outdoor	***6.32E-09***	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 10" outlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Outdoor	***6.32E-09***	Acceptable (√)
TOTAL Risk for Worker (PRMS)			***1.26E-08***	**Acceptable (√)**

Regarding to the results from risk calculations; the risk to ***PRMS Worker found in ALARP Region, Public for PRMS and Off-Take Point found in Acceptable Region,*** so there are some points need to be considered to keep the risk tolerability and this will be describe in the study recommendations.

The following figure show the Individual Risk "IR" for Qwesna PRMS and Off-Take point:



The level of Individual Risk to the most exposed Workers at Qwesna PRMS, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is ***ALARP***.

The level of Individual Risk to the most exposed Public at Qwesna PRMS area, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is ***Acceptable***.

The level of Individual Risk to the most exposed Public at Qwesna Off-Take area, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is ***Acceptable***.

Introduction

The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS" has engaged Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company "PETROSAFE" to identify and evaluate hazards generated from the "New Natural Gas Pressure Reduction and Odorant Station – PRMS" at Qwesna City – Monufia Governorate – Egypt. The PRMS operated by Egypt Gas Company in order to advice protective measures for minimizing risk up to acceptable level.

As part of this review, a QRA study conducted for the following objectives:

- Identify hazardous scenarios related to the most critical unexpected event(s).
- Determine the likelihood of the identified scenarios;
- Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
- Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified hazardous scenarios.

The proposed study should also identify existing arrangements for the prevention of major accidents and their mitigation. This would involve emergency plan and procedure for dealing with such events.

PETROSAFE selected to carry out this study, as it has the experience in conducting this type of work.

PETROSAFE is also empowered by the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation "EGPC" to identify and evaluate factors that relate to Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection.

Technical Definitions

ALARP	*Stands for "As Low As Reasonably Practicable", and is a term often used in the milieu of safety-critical and safety-involved systems. The ALARP principle is that the residual risk shall be as low as reasonably practicable.*
API	*American Petroleum Institute.*
Confinement	*A qualitative or quantitative measure of the enclosure or partial enclosure areas where vapors cloud may be contained.*
Congestion	*A qualitative or quantitative measure of the physical layout, spacing, and obstructions within a facility that promote development of a vapor cloud explosion.*
DNV PHAST	*Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool "PHAST" established by Det Norske Veritas "DNV". Phast examines the progress of a potential incident from the initial release to far-field dispersion including modelling of pool spreading and evaporation, and flammable and toxic effects.*
E&P Forum	*Exploration and Production "E&P" Forum is the international association of oil companies and petroleum industry organizations formed in 1974. It was established to represent its members' interests at the specialized agencies of the United Nations, governmental and other international bodies concerned with regulating the exploration and production of oil and gas.*
EGAS	*The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company.*
EGPC	*The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation.*
EX	*Explosion Proof Type Equipment.*
EERA	*Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment.*
ESD	*Emergency Shut Down.*
Explosion	*Explosion is the delayed ignition of gas in a confined or congested area resulting in high overpressure waves.* *Once the explosion occurs, it creates a blast wave that has a very steep pressure rise at the wave front and a blast wind that is a*

	transient flow behind the blast wave. The impact of the blast wave on structure near the explosion known as blast loading. The two important aspects of the blast loading concern are the prediction of the magnitude of the blast and of the pressure loading onto the local structures. Pressure loading predication as result of a blast; resemble a pulse of trapezoidal or triangular shape. They normally have duration of between approximately 40 msec and 400 msec. The time to maximum pressure is typically 20 msec. *Primary damage from an explosion may result from several events:* 1. *Overpressure - the pressure developed between the expanding gas and its surrounding atmosphere.* 2. *Pulse - the differential pressure across a plant as a pressure wave passes might cause collapse or movement, both positive and negative.* 3. *Missiles and Shrapnel - are whole or partial items that are thrown by the blast of expanding gases that might cause damage or event escalation. In general, these "missiles" from atmospheric vapor cloud explosions cause minor impacts to process equipment since insufficient energy is available to lift heavy objects and cause major impacts. Small projectile objects are still a hazard to personnel and may cause injuries and fatalities. Impacts from rupture incidents may produce catastrophic results.*
(ETA) Event Tree Analysis	*Is a forward, bottom up, logical modeling technique for both success and failure that explores responses through a single initiating event and lays a path for assessing probabilities of the outcomes and overall system analysis. This analysis technique used to analyze the effects of functioning or failed systems, given that an event has occurred.*
Failure Rate	*Is the frequency with which an engineered system or component fails, expressed in failures per unit of time. It is highly used in reliability engineering.*
GASCO	*The Egyptian Natural Gas Company.*
Gas Cloud Dispersion	*Gas cloud air dilution naturally reduces the concentration to below the LEL or no longer considered ignitable (typically defined as 50 % of the LEL).*

HSE Policy	*Health, Safety and Environmental Policy.*
Hazard	*An inherent physical or chemical characteristic (flammability, toxicity, corrosively, stored chemical or mechanical energy) or set of conditions that has the potential for causing harm to people, property, or the environment.*
(HAZOP) Hazard And Operability Study	*Is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. The HAZOP technique is qualitative, and aims to stimulate the imagination of participants to identify potential hazards and operability problems; structure and completeness given by using guideword prompts.*
(HAZID) Hazard Identification Study	*Is a tool for hazard identification, used early in a project as soon as process flow diagrams, draft heat and mass balances, and plot layouts are available. Existing site infrastructure, weather, and Geotechnical data also required, these being a source of external hazards.*
(HAC) Hazardous Area Classification	*When electrical equipment is used in, around, or near an atmosphere that has flammable gases or vapors, flammable liquids, combustible dusts, ignitable fibers or flying's, there is always a possibility or risk that a fire or explosion might occur. Those areas where the possibility or risk of fire or explosion might occur due to an explosive atmosphere and/or mixture is often called a hazardous (or classified) location/area.*
(IR) Individual Risk	*The risk to a single person inside a particular building. Maximum individual risk is the risk to the most-exposed person and assumes that the person is exposed.*
Jet Fire	*A jet fire is a pressurized stream of combustible gas or atomized liquid (such as a high-pressure release from a gas pipe or wellhead blowout event) that is burning. If such a release is ignited soon after it occurs, (i.e., within 2 - 3 minutes), the result is an intense jet flame. This jet fire stabilizes to a point that is close to the source of release, until the release stopped. A jet fire is usually a very localized, but very destructive to anything close to it. This is partly because as well as producing thermal radiation, the jet fire causes considerable convective heating in the region*

	beyond the tip of the flame. The high velocity of the escaping gas entrains air into the gas "jet" causing more efficient combustion to occur than in pool fires. *Consequentially, a much higher heat transfer rate occurs to any object immersed in the flame, i.e., over 200 kW/m2 (62,500 Btdsq. ft) for a jet fire than in a pool fire flame. Typically, the first 10% of a jet fire length is conservatively considered un-ignited gas, as a result of the exit velocity causing the flame to lift off the gas point of release. This effect has been measured on hydrocarbon facility flares at 20% of the jet length, but a value of 10% is used to account for the extra turbulence around the edges of a real release point as compared to the smooth gas release from a flare tip. Jet flames have a relatively cool core near the source. The greatest heat flux usually occurs at impingement distances beyond 40% of the flame length, from its source. The greatest heat flux is not necessarily on the directly impinged side.*
kW/m^2	*Kilowatt per square meter – unit for measuring the heat radiation (or heat flux).*
LFL / LEL	*Lower Flammable Limit / Lower Explosive Limit - The lowest concentration (percentage) of a gas or a vapor in air capable of producing a flash of fire in presence of an ignition source.*
MSDS	*Material Safety Data Sheet.*
mm Hg	*A millimeter of mercury is a manometeric unit of pressure, formerly defined as the extra pressure generated by a column of mercury one millimeter high.*
MEL	*Maximum Exposure Limit.*
NFPA	*National Fire Protection Association.*
N	*North Direction.*
NE	*Northern East Direction.*
NW	*Northern West Direction.*
N/D	*Not Determined. (It means not getting results from the software's calculations)*

N/R	*Not Reached. (It means the resulting consequence doesn't reach the surrounding receptors "if any")*
OGP	*Oil and Gas Producers.*
ppm	*Part Per Million.*
PRMS	*Pressure Reduction and Metering Station.*
P&ID's	*Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams.*
PETROSAFE	*Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company.*
QRA	*Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is a formal and systematic approach to estimating the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events, and expressing the results quantitatively as risk to people, the environment or your business.*
Risk	*Relates to the probability of exposure to a hazard, which could result in harm to personnel, the environment or public. Risk is a measure of potential for human injury or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the injury / loss.*
Risk Assessment	*The identification and analysis, either qualitative or quantitative, of the likelihood and outcome of specific events or scenarios with judgments of probability and consequences.*
scm/hr	*Standard Cubic Meter Per Hour.*
SCBA	*Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.*
SE	*Southern East Direction.*
SW	*Southern West Direction.*
TWA	*Time Weighted Averages.*
UFL/UEL	*Upper flammable limit, the flammability limit describing the richest flammable mixture of a combustible gas.*
UVCE	*When a flammable vapor is released, its mixture with air will form a flammable vapor cloud. If ignited, the flame speed may accelerate to high velocities and produce significant blast overpressure.*
V	*Volume.*
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)	*An explosion in air of a flammable material cloud.*

Objectives

The objectives of this QRA for the unit facilities are:

- Identify hazardous scenarios related to the facilities based on historical data recorded;
- Determine the likelihood (frequencies) of the identified scenarios;
- Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
- Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified hazardous scenarios;
- Evaluate the risk against the acceptable risk level to ensure that it is within *As Low As Reasonably Practicable "ALARP"*, otherwise additional control measures and recommendations will be provided at this study to reduce the Risk, *(ALARP).*

Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Scope

The scope of work of this QRA study is limited to the following:

- Identification of the Most Critical Event$_{(s)}$ or scenarios that may lead to fatal accidents as well as to ensure that the expected risk will not exceed the Acceptable Risk Level as per national and international standards;
- To assess and quantify the risks associated with Qwesna PRS (New & Existing PRS’s) and the off-take point on the neighboring / surrounding community;
- The study determines Frequencies, Consequences (Including Associated Effect Contours) and Potential Risk of Fatality for the identified hazardous scenarios;
- Normal operation of the facilities (e.g. Construction and specific maintenance activities) are excluded from this analysis.

Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Studies

Method of Assessment

1.0- General Method Used

Attention mainly focussed on those accidents where a gross failure of containment could result in the generation of a large vapour cloud of flammable or toxic material. The approach adopted has involved the following stages:

- Identification of hazardous materials,
- Establishment of maximum total inventories and location.

During the site visit by the study team, the overall functioning of the site discussed in some detail and the Companies asked to provide a complete list of holdings of hazardous materials. A preliminary survey notes was issued by the team, as a private communication to the company concerned, and this formed the basis for subsequent more discussion and analysis.

From the PRMS design model provided by the client, it was impractical to examine in depth all possible failure modes for all parts within the time allowed for this study. Instead, only those potential failures, which might contribute, either directly or indirectly, to off-site risks were examined.

2.0- Risk Assessment

As the PRMS designed and prepared for construction, so it was therefore necessary for the study team to identify and analyse the hazards potential from first principles the routes by which a single or multiple accident could affect the community or neighbouring.

The terms of reference required the team to investigate and determine the overall risk to health and safety both from individual installations and then foreseeable interactions.

The assessment of risk in a complex situation is difficult. No method is perfect as all have advantages and limitations.

It was agreed that the quantitative approach was the most meaningful way of comparing and evaluating different risks. The risk assessment framework shown in Figure (1) used for the study.



Figure (1) Risk Assessment Framework

Modeling the Consequences

Modeling of the consequences is one of the key steps in Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA", as it provides the link between hazard identification (in this study Potential Loss of Containment Incidents) and the determination of possible impact of those incidents on People (Worker / Public), Asset and the Environment.

In this study, Natural Gas (Mainly Methane CH_4) was considered. There are several types of consequences to be considered for modelling, these include Gas Dispersion (UFL - LFL - 50 % LFL) / Heat Radiation / Explosion Overpressure modeling, also each of these scenarios described in the following table:

Table (1) Description of Modeling of the Different Scenario

Discharge Modeling	*Modeling of the mass release rate and its variation overtime.*
Radiation Modeling	*Modeling of the Thermal radiation from fires.*
Dispersion Modeling	*Modeling of the Gas and two-phase releases.*
Overpressure	*Associated with explosions or pressure burst.*

Toxic hazards are considered as result of releases / loss of containment for which discharge modeling and gas dispersion modeling are required. The hazard ranges are dependent upon the condition of the release pressure and rate of release.

There are a number of commercial software for modeling gas dispersion, fire, explosion and toxic releases. PETROSAFE select the *DNV PHAST Ver. 7.21 Software package* in modeling scenarios.

The software developed by DNV in order to provide a standard and validated set of consequence models that can be used to predict the effects of a release of hydrocarbon or chemical liquid or vapour. (Results of the modeling presented in pages from 60 to 106)

Criterion for Risk Tolerability

The main function of this phase of the work was to assess the effectiveness of the proposed arrangement for managing risks against performance standards.

In order to do this, we need firstly to define a performance standard and secondly, to be able to analyse the effectiveness of the arrangements in a manner which permits a direct comparison with these standards.

The defining of performance standards undertakes at the following three levels:

- Policy-based
- System
- Technical

Where the present work is mainly concerned with the assessment against the standards associated with the first two levels.

The policy-based performance standard relates to this objective to provide a working environment, where the risk to the individual reduced to a level that is ALARP.

This performance standard is therefore, expressed in the form of individual risk and the arrangements for managing this risk should result in a level of 'Individual Risk', based on a proposed Tolerability Criteria, Figure (2).



Figure (2) HSE Framework for Tolerability Risk

The criterion for IR tolerability for workers and to the public outlined in Table (2) and Figure (3).

It should be noted that this criteria proposed only as a guideline. Risk assessment is no substitute to professional judgement.

Table (2) Proposed Individual Risk (IR) Criteria (per person/year)

Risk Level	Workers	Public
Intolerable	*> 10^{-3} per person/yr.*	*> 10^{-4} per person/yr.*
Negligible	*> 10^{-5} per person/yr.*	*> 10^{-6} per person/yr.*



Figure (3) Proposed Individual Risk Criteria

Workers would include the Company employees and contractors. The public includes the public, visitors, and any third party who is not directly involved in the Company work activities.

On this basis, we have chosen to set our level of intolerability at Individual Risk for workers of 1 in 1,000 per year, and we define an individual risk of 1 in 100,000 per year as broadly acceptable. Consequently, our ALARP region is between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 100,000 per person/year.

It is important to ensure that conflict between these subordinate standards and those stemming from international codes and standards are avoided and that any subordinate standards introduced are at least on a par with or augment those standards, which are associated with compliance with these international requirements. These system level performance standards are included as part of the summaries from the QRA. These used as the basis for assessing the suitability and sufficiency of Egypt Gas Site arrangements for both protecting personnel on site and members of public from major hazards and securing effective response in an emergency. Failure to meet acceptance criteria at this level results in the identification of remedial measures for assessment both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The analytical work use a system analysis approach and divided into a number of distinct phases:

- Data collection, including results from site-based qualitative assessments.
- Definition of arrangements.
- Qualitative evaluation of arrangements against a catalogue of fire and explosion hazards from other major accident hazards.
- Preparing of event tree analysis models.
- Consolidation of list of design events.
- Analysis of the effect of design events on fire, explosion and toxic hazard management and emergency response arrangements.
- Quantification of that impact in terms of individual risk.

The main model would base on a systems approach, and it takes the following form:

- Estimates of incremental individual risk (IIR) per person/yr.
- Is caused-consequences based.
- Uses event tree analysis to calculate the frequency of occurrence.
- Estimates incremental individual risk utilizing event tree analysis, based on modeling the emergency response arrangements from detection through to recovery to a place of safety.

Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage

A criterion used in the QRA study for the calculation of personnel vulnerability and structural / asset damage because of fire, explosion and toxic release shown in Table (3).

The criteria shown below provide some assumptions for the impairment effects of hydrocarbon releases on personnel and structures, which based on Health and Safety Executive: Methods of approximation and determination of human vulnerability for offshore major accident hazard assessment.

Table (3) Criteria for Personnel Vulnerability & Structural Damage

Event Type	Threshold of Fatality	Asset/Structural Damage
Jet and Diffusive Fire Impingement	6.3 kW/ m^2 (1) 12.5 kW/m^2 (2)	- Flame impingement 10 minutes. - 300 - 500 kW/m^2 Structural Failure within 20 minutes.
Pool Fire Impingement	6.3 kW/ m^2 (1) 12.5 kW/m^2 (2)	- Flame impingement 20 minutes - 100 - 150 kW/m^2 Structural Failure within 30 minutes.
Smoke	2.3% v/v (3) 15% v/v (4)	
Explosion Overpressure	300 mbar	100 mbar

(1) Fatality within 1 - 2 minutes
(2) Fatal < 1 minute
(3) Above 2.3%, escape possible but difficult
(4) No escape possible, fatal in a few seconds

The effects of exposure to fire expressed in terms of heat radiation (kW/m^2) and overpressure waves shown in Tables (4), (5) and (6).

*Table (4) Heat Radiation Effects on Structures (International Data Bank) **

Radiation Level kW/m^2	Observed Effect
37.5	Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment.
25	Minimum energy to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure (non-piloted).
12.5	Minimum energy required to ignite wood, melting of plastic tubing.

Table (5) Heat Radiation Effects on People

Radiation Level kW/m^2	Effects on People
1.2	Equivalent to heat from sun at midday summer.
1.6	Minimum level at which pain can be sensed.
4 - 6	Pain caused in 15 - 20 seconds, Second Degree burns after 30 seconds.
12	20 % chance of fatality for 60 seconds exposure.
25	100 % chance of fatality for continuous exposure. 50 % chance of fatality for 30 seconds exposure.
40	30 % chance of fatality for 15 seconds exposure.
50	100 % chance of fatality for 20 seconds exposure.

***Ref.1**- OGP, International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, March 2010.*

***Ref.2**- API 521.*

Table (6) Effects of Overpressure

Pressure		Effects / Damage
bar	**psig**	
0.002	**0.03**	Occasional breakage of glass windows.
0.006	**0.1**	Breakage of some small windows.
0.021	**0.3**	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05. 10 % glass broken.
0.027	**0.4**	Minor structural damage of buildings.
0.068	**1.0**	Partial collapse of walls and roofs, possible injuries.
0.137	**2.0**	Some severe injuries, death unlikely.
0.206	**3.0**	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation.
0.275	**4.0**	Oil storage tanks ruptured.
0.344	**5.0**	Wooden utilities poles snapped / Fatalities.
0.41	**6.0**	Nearly complete destruction of building.
0.48	**7.0**	Loaded wagon train overturned.
0.689	**10.0**	Total destruction of buildings.

Quantification of the Frequency of Occurrence

The probability of a sequence of events leading to a major hazard is dependent on the probability of each event in a sequence occurring; usually these probabilities may be multiplied together to obtain the end event probability or frequency.

The technique of Quantified Risk Assessment 'QRA' requires data in the form of probability or frequency to be estimated for each input event.

Ideally, data relating to hardware failures and human error that are specific to each plant should be obtained from the company's maintenance and historical records.

Unfortunately, records available were not in the form that allows data relevant to this study to be obtained. Therefore, other sources of data were used as a basis for failure/error scenarios. The sources of information and data are shown in the References section of this report.

Identification of Scenarios Leading to Selected Failures

For each selected failure scenario, the potential contributory factors were examined, taking into account any protective features available. Typically, the factors examined included:

- Operator error
- Metallurgical fatigue or ageing of materials
- Internal or external Corrosion
- Loss of process control, e.g. pressure, temperature or flow, etc.
- Overfilling of vessels
- Introduction of impurities
- Fire and/or explosion
- Missiles
- Flooding

Account was taken at this stage of those limited releases, which, although in themselves did not constitute a significant off-site hazard could, under some circumstances, initiate a sequence leading to a larger release, as a knock-on effect.

It was noted that the proposed criterion for risk tolerability was used in Egypt by the following organizations: British Gas / British Petroleum / Shell / Total.

Relevant Weather Data for the Study

- **Weather Data**

The Weather Data relevant to this study consists of a list of weather conditions in the form of different combinations of wind-speed/direction, temperature, humidity and atmospheric stability. Table (7)

The weather conditions are an important input into the dispersion calculations and results for a single set of conditions could give a misleading picture of the hazard potential.

Met-oceanographic data gathered from Weather base for Monufia Governorate (Qwesna area) over a period of some years.

These data included wind speed, wind direction, air temperature and humidity, as well as current speed, direction and wave height.

Table (7) Annual Average Temperature, Relative Humidity and Wind Speed / Direction

• Air Temperature ºC		
	Min. Recorded	**13** ºC
	Max. Recorded	**28** ºC
	Annual Average	***21 ºC***
• Relative Humidity %		
	Average Daily Min.	**48 %**
	Average Daily Max.	**65 %**
	Annual Average	***56 %***
• Wind Speed m/s		
	Annual Average	***4.6 m / sec.***
• Wind Direction		
	Annual Average	***N / NW***

The general climatic conditions at Monufia Governorate are summarized in Tables No. (8, 9 & 10) Below.

Table (8) Mean of Monthly Air Temperature (°C)

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Temp. (c°)	13	13	16	20	24	27	28	28	26	23	20	15

Table (9) Mean of Monthly Wind Speed (m/sec)

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Wind Speed (m/sec)	5.7	4.3	4.7	4.3	4.8	4.3	4.2	3.8	3.9	5.9	4	5.2

Table (10) Mean of Monthly Average Relative Humidity

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Relative Humidity (%)	62	54	51	50	48	49	55	55	62	58	64	65

Figure (4) shows the maximum temperature diagram for Monufia Governorate



Figure (4) – Monthly Variations of the Maximum Temperature – Monufia Governorate

Figures (5 & 6) show the monthly variations of the wind speed as well as wind rose for Monufia Governorate respectively.



Figure (5) – Monthly Variations of the Wind Speed – Monufia Governorate



Figure (6) –Wind Rose – Monufia Governorate

Figure (7) shows the monthly variations of the sunny, cloudy and precipitation days for Monufia Governorate.



Figure (7) – Monthly Variations of the Sunny, Cloudy and Precipitation days for Monufia Governorate

- **Stability Categories**

  The two most significant variables, which would affect the dispersion calculations, are Wind-speed and atmospheric stability. The stability class is a measure of the atmospheric turbulence caused by thermal gradients. Pasqual Stability identifies six main categories, which shown in the Tables (11 & 12) and summarized in Table (13).

Table (11) Pasqual Stability Categories

A	B	C	D	E	F
Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Unstable	Neutral	Moderately Stable	Stable

Neutral conditions correspond to a vertical temperature gradient of about 1° C per 100 m.

Table (12) Relationship between Wind Speed and Stability

Wind speed	Day-time Solar Radiation			Night-time Cloud Cover		
(m/s)	Strong	Medium	Slight	Thin <3/8	Medium >3/8	Overcast >4/5
<2	A	A-B	B	-	-	D
2-3	A-B	B	C	E	F	D
3-5	B	B-C	C	D	E	D
5-6	C	C-D	D	D	D	D
>6	C	D	D	D	D	D

Table (13) Sets of Weather Conditions Initially Selected for this Study

Set for Wind Speed and Stability	
Wind speed	Stability
4.6 m/sec.	D

Qwesna PRMS Description

Background

Qwesna Pressure Reduction and Metering Station Operated by Egypt Gas Company. It is located about 2 km East west direction from Qwesna City downtown and 1.7 km Southwest Sharanis Village. It consists of existing facilities that will be modified by adding new pressure reduction facilities to increase its feeding capacity. The PRMS (existing and new) provides the natural gas to Qwesna and surrounding area public housing.

The PRMS feeding will be from the National Gas Pipeline owned by GASCO by off-take point at a distance of about 120 m from the PRMS premises. The off-take point pressure will be from 25 to 70 bar, and then the pressure reduced to 7 bar at the PRMS facilities with adding odorant, and then connected to the internal distribution network to public housing at Qwesna and surrounding area. The PRMS description will be as following:

The PRMS & Off-Take Point Location Coordinates (Egypt Gas Data)

Point	North (N)	East (E)	North (N)	East (E)
	PRMS & Off-Take Point - Location Coordinates			
	PRMS		**Off-take Point**	
	30 º 32 ' 07.81 "	*31 º 08 ' 55.39 "*	*30 º 32 ' 04.29 "*	*31 º 08 ' 56.86 "*
	PRMS & Off-Take Point - Boundary Coordinates			
	PRMS		**Off-take Point**	
1	*30 º 32 ' 09.04 "*	*31 º 08 ' 55.82 "*	*30 º 32 ' 04.74 "*	*31 º 08 ' 56.79 "*
2	*30 º 32 ' 08.94 "*	*31 º 08 ' 54.58 "*	*30 º 32 ' 04.71 "*	*31 º 08 ' 57.24 "*
3	*30 º 32 ' 06.64 "*	*31 º 08 ' 55.13 "*	*30 º 32 ' 04.18 "*	*31 º 08 ' 56.12 "*
4	*30 º 32 ' 06.61 "*	*31 º 08 ' 56.00 "*	*30 º 32 ' 03.97 "*	*31 º 08 ' 56.21 "*

The following figure (8) shows the Off-take Point from GASCO pipeline, Gas Feeding Pipeline and Qwesna PRMS site:



Figure (8) Qwesna PRMS, Gas Feeding Pipeline and Off-Take Point Plot Plan Plotted on Google Earth Photo

PRMS Components (Egypt Gas Data)

The PRMS will be surround by 3 m height fence and mainly consist of the following: (Ref. Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11)

- Inlet Section: Inlet full bore ball valve with equalizing by-pass valve. The actuator manually and automatically monitored and controlled (open/close) inside the control cabinet.
  The inlet section contents equipped with Pressure gauge / Pressure transmitter / Temperature gauge / Temperature transmitter / Vent valve.

- Dust Filter Section: Two filters/separators lines, each line, separate liquids such as natural gas condensate and water, as well as particles like rust, sand, scale, etc.
  Each filter/separator consist of multi cyclone separation stage, cartridge element and have valves and instrumentation including a vent and depressurization connections.
  The filter/separator equipped by: Inlet and outlet plug valves / Pressure indicator / Differential pressure indicator with switch / Level indicator / Drain valve (ball valve followed by globe valve) and Vent valves / safety relief valve / Maintenance manhole.
  Condensation tank of 1000 lit capacity equipped by level indicator with isolation valves, 2 manual drain ball valve.

- Metering Section: the metering section consists of multi meter runs and associated instrumentation, which is necessary to calculate correct, record and count the gas flow.
  Changeover of the metering streams achieved by manually operated valves.
  The equipment of one metering run comprise of: Inlet and Outlet ball valves (full bore) / Flow turbine meter / Vent connection with double block isolation valves / Pressure Transmitter / Temperature transmitter / Two pulse transmitters (HF,LF) for each turbine

The meter section instrumentations designed and connected to the flow computer for totalize, volume correction, recording, etc.

- Regulator Section: Comprises of two runs, each designed of 100 % of design flow rate. The purpose of the pressure regulation section is to reduce the inlet pressure and keep the outlet pressure within the specified pressure range.
Each regulating run equipped with: Inlet and outlet ball valve (full bore) / One slam shut valve quick acting equipped with limit switches for open/close indication and manual reset / Two gas pressure regulators (monitor and active) fail to open / One vent connection with double block / Pressure indicators / Temperature indicator / One safety pilot relief valve / Pressure transmitter / Temperature transmitter on the outlet header.

- Gas Heater System: The heating system is based on using two water bath heaters with inlet isolating ball valve / Regulator with OPSO / Safety relief valve / outlet valve.
Inlet header equipped with Temperature transmitter for inlet gas measurement / Pressure gauge / drain and vent valves.
Outlet header equipped with Temperature transmitter for outlet gas measurement / pressure gauge / drain and vent valves
Each of the heaters equipped with control panel located adjacent to water bath heater. The control of temperature sensed from the outlet after the regulator lines to automatically control temperature, and the outlet temperature set point adjusted from the heater controller.
The water heater have safety devices as water compensation tank level / water temperature controller / pilot and burner failure controller / main burner feed gas controller.

− Outlet Section:	Contains manual outlet isolation valve. The main outlet piping and header designed for 100 % of the maximum flow rate and equipped with required instrumentation as per PRMS P&ID The outlet section equip by full bore ball valve with equalizing by-pass valve / pressure gauge / pressure transmitter / temperature gauge / temperature transmitter / vent valve.
− Odorant Section:	The odorant system operates in accordance with injection method. A small odorant plant installed separately on the line, which feeds the residential area network with natural gas. The capacity of this odorant plant is suitable to odorize the maximum station flow with odorizing rate of 12-30 mg/scm. The section contents of one bulk tank with a capacity of 600 lit’s and one 50 lit’s small container for daily use. The bulk tank equipped by side graduated glass / drain valve / temperature and pressure indicators.
− Off-take Point:	Gas feeding will be from up-ground room surrounded by 3 m height brick wall fence containing connection pipes and isolation valves with GASCO underground pipeline 32”, connected to 8” PRMS feeding pipeline.
− Auxiliary Systems:	The main power is supplied from the city network. An emergency generator (gas engine) used as stand-by, and automatically operated in case of power failure. The control panel and flow computer covered by one dual conversion online UPS unit as stand-by power supply.

- Security Office (one floor)
- Administration office (one floor)
- Firefighting Facilities (Fire Water Tank / Pumps / Fire water Network)

The following table no. (14) Describes the New PRMS process units:

Table (14) Qwesna New PRMS Units

No	PRMS Units	Capacity	Size
1	***Inlet Unit***		
	Inlet valve	40,000 scmh	8"
	Inlet valve bypass (ball + plug)	-	3"
2	***Filter Unit***		
	Line Fl	20,000 scmh	6" x 4"
	Line F2	20,000 scmh	6" x 4"
	Line F3 (only two valves)	20,000 scmh	6" x 4"
3	***Meter Unit***		
	Line Ml	20,000 scmh	4" x 6" x 4"
	Line M2	20,000 scmh	4" x 6" x 4"
	Line M3 (only two valves)	20,000 scmh	4"
4	***Heater Unit***		
	Water Bath Heater		
	Line H1 (200 kw)	20,000 scmh	4"
	Heater Bypass Line	40,000 scmh	6"
	Line H2 (only two valves)	20,000 scmh	4"
5	***Regulator Unit***		
	Line Rl	20,000 scmh	6" x 4"
	Line R2	20,000 scmh	6" x 4"
	Line R3(only two valves)	20,000 scmh	6" x 4"
6	***Odorant Unit***		
	Electrical pumps		
	Lapping system		
7	***Outlet Unit***		
	Outlet valve	40,000 scmh	10"
8	***Monitoring and Control Unit***		
9	***Generator (15 KVA)***		
10	***UPS***		



Figure (9) Qwesna PRS New & Existing Facilities General Layout (Egypt Gas Data)



Figure (10) Qwesna PRS New Facilities General Layout (Egypt Gas Data)



Figure (11) Qwesna PRMS Piping & Instrumentation Diagram P&ID (Egypt Gas Data)

Qwesna Pressure Reduction Station Process Description

Pressure Reduction and Metering Station (PRMS)

Consists of equipment installed for automatically reducing and regulating the pressure in the downstream pipeline or main to which it is connected. Included are piping and auxiliary devices such as valves, control instruments, control lines, the enclosure, and ventilation equipment.

PRMS required for Qwesna having an inlet pressure range (25 - 70 barg), outlet pressure 7 barg, and maximum flow rate 20000 Sm^3/h extendable to 40000 Sm^3/h.

Process Condition Data (Egypt Gas Data)

The following table no (15) describes the process conditions and gas specs data for Qwesna PRMS:

Table (15) Process Conditions / Gas Components & Specifications

Process Conditions	
Maximum flow rate Sm^3 / hr	20000
Future flow rate Sm^3 / hr	40000
Design pressure bar g	70
Operating pressure bar g	25 – 70
Min / Max outlet pressure bar g	7
Min / Max inlet temperature °C	+15 to +25
Outlet temperature °C	Not less than "1"
Gas Components	
Gas composition % Mol	
Water	0
H_2S	4 ppm
Nitrogen	0.2 - 0.83
Carbon Dioxide	0.07 - 3
Methane	77.73 - 99.82
Ethane	0.03 - 15.68
Propane	0.01 - 4.39
I-Butane	0.0 - 1.14
N-Butane	0.0 - 1.01
I-Pentane	0.0 - 0.19
N-Pentane	0.0 - 0.26
$C6^+$	0.0 - 0.25
Gas Specifications	
Specific gravity	0.5 - 0.69

Pressure Reduction Station Mechanical Works

Constructing Pressure Reduction Stations and city gate regulators are regular construction works in addition to connections between transmission mains and distribution mains.

The PRMS comprises two types of pressures, the first is the upstream pressure, which a high pressure is ranging from 25 to 70 Bar, while the second pressure is the downstream pressure, which is a low pressure (7 bar).

Inlet stage

The inlet components of the PRMS should be completely isolated from the cathodic system applied to the feeding steel pipes. This is achieved by installing isolating joint with protection.

Filtration Stage

The aim of the filtration stage is to remove dust, rust, solid contaminants and liquid traces. Two filters and two separators are installed in parallel; each filter-separator operates with the full capacity of the PRMS. Filter-separator lines are equipped with safety devices such as differential pressure gauges, relief valves, liquid indicators, etc.

Heating Stage

Because the difference between the inlet and outlet pressure is relatively high, icing normally occurs around outlet pipes. This may cause blockings and accordingly reduce or stop the gas flow. To avoid such circumstances, a heater is installed to keep the temperature of outlet pipes over 7 °C. Each PRMS is equipped with two heaters in parallel in order to allow for a standby heater in emergencies.

Reduction Stage

Each PRMS includes two reduction lines in parallel, also to allow for a standby line. The lines are equipped with safety gauges, indicators and transmitters to maintain safe operation conditions. According to the IGEM standards, the reduction unit should be installed in a well-ventilated-closed area or, alternatively, in an open protected area.

Measuring Stage

After adjusting the outlet pressure, gas flow and cumulative consumption then measured to monitor Natural Gas consumption from the PRMS and to adjust the dosing of the odorant as indicated below. Measuring devices should be sensitive to low gas flow, which normally occurs during the first stages after connecting a small portion of targeted clients.

Odorizing Stage

The objective of the odorant is to enable the detection of gas leaks in residential units at low concentration, before gas concentration becomes hazardous. The normally used odorant is composed of Tert-butyl mercaptan (TBM) (80%) and Methyl-sulphide (20%). The normal dosing rate of the odorant is 12-30 mg/cm^3. The system consists of stainless steel tank with a capacity of 600 liters and small vessel with capacity of 50 liters for daily use.

Outlet Stage

The outlet stage includes an outlet valve gauge, temperature indicators, pressure and temperature transmitters and non-return valves. The outlet pipes are also, like inlet pipes, isolated from the cathodic protection by an isolating joint.

Operating Philosophy and Control

Automatically reducing of pressure according to setting pressure of regulators and monitored by control room.

Shutdown and Isolation Philosophy

Pressure reduction station consist of main inlet and outlet valves to isolate PRMS in any Emergency case under specific procedure. In order to isolate PRMS in crisis and no any access available buried valves outside PRMS contours shall be used.

Gas Odorant Specifications

The odorant supplied with a Hazard Data Sheet and identified as Spotleak 1009. Spotleak is an aliphatic mixture in clear liquid form that is extremely flammable, with the following characteristics:

- Boiling Range 60-70^o C
- Flash Point -17.8^o C
- Freezing Point -45.5^o C
- Density (H_2O = 1) 0.812 @ 15.5^o C
- Vapor Density 3.0 (air = 1)
- Vapor Pressure (mm Hg) 6.6 @ 37.8^o C

Health Hazards

Spotleak is not carcinogenic, but the major health hazards as a result of exposure to Spotleak include the following:

Inhalation

- Short-term exposure: Irritation and central nervous system effects
- Long-term exposure: Irritation

Skin Contact

- Short-term: Irritation
- Long-term: Dermatitis

Eye Contact

- Short-term: Irritation and tearing
- Long-term: Irritation

Ingestion

- Short-term: nausea, vomiting, central nervous system effects
- Long-term: no effects are known

Hygiene Standards and Limits

Occupational Exposure Limit for Spotleak to all components is 45 ppm, and the long-term “MEL” should be below 12 ppm (8 hrs. “TWA”).

Fire and Explosion Hazards

Spotleak is a severe fire hazard. Vapor/air mixtures are explosive. Vapor is 3 times heavier than air. Vapor may ignite at distant ignition sources and flash back.

Thermal decomposition products include oxides of sulphur and hydrogen sulphide.

Firefighting and Protection Systems and Facilities

As per minutes of the meeting dated 20/07/2016 with Civil Protection, the PRMS will provided by the following fire protection facilities:

- Firewater tank with a capacity of 40 cum.
- Firewater pumps (1 electrical & 1 diesel with capacity of 250 gpm each).
- Firewater main with a diameter of 4 inch.
- Firewater hydrants 1.5 inch X 1 / each.
- Firewater monitors.
- Smoke detector in all admin rooms.
- Heat detectors in buffet rooms.
- Smoke detectors in control rooms according to the area.
- Different sizes of fire extinguishers will be distributed at PRMS site.

Emergency Response Plan "ERP"

An Emergency Response Plan "ERP" for Qwesna PRMS need to be reviewed by Egypt Gas during Construction phase and before startup operation and to include the following items:

- ERP objectives,
- Notification Chart,
- Main Emergency Room Members Contacts,
- Egypt Gas Branches Contacts,
- Calling of External Aids / Authorities at Qwesna Area,
- Roles & Responsibilities,
  - Security;
  - Firefighting;
  - Rescue & Evacuation;
  - First Aid;
  - Power Shutdown;
  - Communications;
- Emergency Procedures in case of Potential Risks.

PRMS & Off-Take Point Area Surrounding Description

It is the main objective of the QRA is to study the major effects on surrounding area that include occupied building, public roads and industrial sites, this point need to determine distances between PRMS, off-take point and the property surrounded (including admin, offices and control room inside).

The following figure (12) describes the distances in between the gas facilities:

Figure (12) Qwesna Pressure Reduction Station and Off-take Point Show Surroundings Plotted on Google Earth Photo

Analytical Results of Consequence Modeling

1.0- Existing Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (6 inch)

1/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (16) Show that:

Table (16) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 1" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	1.60	1.08	0.16 @ 1.00 m
	LFL	5.60	1.30	0.60 @ 3.50 m
	50 % LFL	9.50	0 – 1.58	1.58 @ 6.00 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m²)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	10.73	1.6	15	10	0
		4	12	6	0
		9.5	8.40	3	0
		12.5	8	2.20	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (13) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1” hole in 6” Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 1” hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 10 m downwind and from 0 – 1.58 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 1.60 m downwind with a height of 1.08 m. The cloud large width will be 0.16 m crosswind at a distance of 1 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 5.60 m downwind with a height of 1.30 m. The cloud large width will be 0.60 m crosswind at a distance of 3.50 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 9.50 m downwind with a height from 0 to 1.58 m. The cloud large width will be 1.58 m crosswind at a distance of 6 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching the new PRS facilities down and crosswind.



Figure (14) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 10.73 meters downwind.
- The 4 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 12 meters downwind and 6 meters crosswind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 8.40 meters downwind and 3 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation extend about 8 meters downwind and 2.20 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.

The modeling shows that the all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary covering some of new PRS facilities down and crosswind.

1/2- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (17) Show that:

Table (17) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 3" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	6.50	1.30	0.60 @ 3.00 m
	LFL	35.50	0 – 2.50	2.50 @ 20.00 m
	50 % LFL	74	0 – 4.30	4.30 @ 55.00 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	36.80	1.6	60	41	0
		4	46	26	0
		9.5	37	15	0
		12.5	35	12	20% /60 sec.
		25	28	6	80.34
		37.5	25	4	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (15) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (3" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 3" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance about 74 m downwind and from 0 to 4.30 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 6.50 m downwind with a height of 1.30 m. The cloud large width will be 0.60 m crosswind at a distance of 3 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 35.50 m downwind with a height of 2.50 m. The cloud large width will be 2.50 m crosswind at a distance of 20 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 74 m downwind with a height from 0 to 4.30 m. The cloud large width will be 4.30 m crosswind at a distance of 55 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to cover the new PRS facilities and reaching the admin office downwind.



Figure (16) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (3" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 3" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 36.80 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 37 meters downwind and 15 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 35 meters downwind and 12 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 28 meters downwind and 6 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 25 meters downwind and 4 meters crosswind.

The modeling shows that the values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the PRMS eastern fence down and crosswind. The value of 12.5 kW/m^2 will cover the control room downwind and reaching the heater crosswind.

1/3- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rupture) Gas Release

The following table no. (18) Show that:

Table (18) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 6" Gas Release

Gas Release

Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
4.6 D	UFL	18	1.85	1.70 @ 10.00 m
	LFL	51.40	0 – 5.30	5.30 @ 51.40 m
	50 % LFL	51.50	0 – 7.25	7.25 @ 51.50 m

Jet Fire

Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
4.6 D	69.60	1.6	133	84	0
		4	94	53	0
		9.5	71	32	0
		12.5	64	27	20 %/60 sec.
		25	52	15	80.34
		37.5	42	10	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire

Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)		Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
		Early	Late		
4.6 D	0.020	149	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	38	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	29	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*

Fireball

Wind Category	Heat Radiation (kW/m²)	Distance (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m²) Effects on People & Structures
4.6 D	1.6	Not Determined	**12.5** *20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec exposure*
	4	Not Determined	**25** *100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure* *50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure*
	9.5	Not Determined	**37.5** *Sufficient of cause process equipment damage*
	12.5	Not Determined	
	25	Not Determined	
	37.5	Not Determined	



Figure (17) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 6" pipeline full rupture without ignition, the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 51 m downwind and over 7 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 18 downwind with a height of 1.85 m. The cloud large width will be 1.70 m crosswind at a distance of 10 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 51.40 m downwind with a height from 0 to 5.30 m. The cloud large width will be 5.30 m crosswind at a distance of 51.40 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 51.50 m downwind with a height from 0 to 7.25 m. The large width will be 7.25 m crosswind at a distance of 51.50 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (UF, LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend over eastern fence and covers the PRMS new facilities and control room downwind.



Figure (18) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 6" pipeline full rupture and ignited the expected flame length is about 69 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 71 meters downwind and 32 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 64 meters downwind and 27 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 52 meters downwind and 15 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 42 meters downwind and 10 meters.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the eastern fence covering the admin and security offices and reaching Sharanis road downwind.



Figure (19) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure shows that if there is gas release from 6" pipeline full rupture and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 149 meters downwind.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 38 meters downwind.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 29 meters downwind.

The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS covering the outside roads and reaching the poultry farm SW side.

The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will cover the control room and extend outside the PRMS from east and west sides.

2.0- New Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (8 inch)

2/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (19) Show that:

Table (19) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 1" / 8" Gas Release

Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	1.70	1.05	0.10 @ 1.00 m
	LFL	5.80	1.32	0.64 @ 3.50 m
	50 % LFL	10.10	0 – 1.60	1.60 @ 6.50 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	11.10	1.6	16	10.60	0
		4	12.60	6.30	0
		9.5	9.80	2.30	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (20) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 8" Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 10 m downwind and from 0 – 1.60 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 1.70 m downwind with a height of 1.05 m. The cloud large width will be 0.10 m crosswind at a distance of 1 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 5.80 m downwind with a height of 1.32 m. The cloud large width will be 0.64 m crosswind at a distance of 3.50 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 10.10 m downwind with a height from 0 to 1.60 m. The cloud large width will be 1.60 m crosswind at a distance of 6.50 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.



Figure (21) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 8" Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 11 meters downwind.
- The 4 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 12.60 meters downwind and 6.30 meters crosswind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 9.80 meters downwind and 2.30 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.

The modeling shows that the all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary. The 4 & 9.5 kW/m^2 values will be near to the heater crosswind.

2/2- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (20) Show that:

Table (20) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 4" / 8" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	10	1.50	1.00 @ 6.00 m
	LFL	61	0 – 3.45	3.45 @ 35.00 m
	50 % LFL	93	0 – 6.40	6.40 @ 93.00 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	49.44	1.6	87	58	0
		4	64	36	0
		9.5	50	22	0
		12.5	46	18	20% /60 sec.
		25	38	9	80.34
		37.5	32	6	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (22) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4” hole in 8” Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 4” hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance about 93 m downwind and from 0 to 6 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 10 m downwind with a height of 1.50 m. The cloud large width will be 1 m crosswind at a distance of 6 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 61 m downwind with a height of 3.45 m. The cloud large width will be 3.45 m crosswind at a distance of 35 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 93 m downwind with a height from 0 to 6.40 m. The cloud large width will be 6.40 m crosswind at a distance of 93 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the admin and security offices downwind.



Figure (23) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4" hole in 8" Inlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 4" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 49 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 50 meters downwind and 22 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 46 meters downwind and 18 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 38 meters downwind and 9 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 32 meters downwind and 6 meters crosswind.

The modeling shows that the values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the PRMS SE fence downwind. The value of 12.5 kW/m^2 will cover the heater crosswind and reaching the offices downwind.

2/3- Consequence Modeling for 8 inch (Full Rupture) Gas Release

The following table no. (21) Show that:

Table (21) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 8" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	29.50	0 – 2.20	2.20 @ 3.00 m
	LFL	56.40	0 – 7.00	7.00 @ 56.00 m
	50 % LFL	56.50	0 – 9.00	9.00 @ 56.50 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	92.87	1.6	186	115	0
		4	129	73	0
		9.5	94	45	0
		12.5	84	37	20 %/60 sec.
		25	67	22	80.34
		37.5	54	15	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	172	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	45	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	35	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*

Fireball			
Wind Category	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2) Effects on People & Structures**
4.6 D	1.6	Not Determined	**12.5** *20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec exposure* **25** *100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure* *50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure* **37.5** *Sufficient of cause process equipment damage*
	4	Not Determined	
	9.5	Not Determined	
	12.5	Not Determined	
	25	Not Determined	
	37.5	Not Determined	



Figure (24) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (8" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture without ignition, the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 56 m downwind and over 9 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 29.50 downwind with a height from 0 to 2.20 m. The cloud large width will be 2.20 m crosswind at a distance of 3 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 56.40 m downwind with a height from 0 to 7 m. The cloud large width will be 7 m crosswind at a distance of 56 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 56.50 m downwind with a height from 0 to 9 m. The large width will be 9 m crosswind at a distance of 56.50 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (UF, LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend over SE corner and covers the PRMS offices down and crosswind.



Figure (25) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (8" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture and ignited the expected flame length is about 92 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 94 meters downwind and 45 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 84 meters downwind and 37 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 67 meters downwind and 22 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 54 meters downwind and 15 meters.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the SE fence covering the admin and security offices and Sharanis road down and crosswind.



Figure (26) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (8" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure shows that if there is gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 172 meters downwind.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 45 meters downwind.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 35 meters downwind.

The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS covering the outside roads and reaching the poultry farm SW side.

The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will covers the offices and extend outside the PRMS from E & W sides.

3.0- Pressure Reduction Station Outlet Pipeline (10 inch)

3/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (22) Show that:

Table (22) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 1" / 10" Gas Release

Gas Release (Outlet / PRV "Low Pressure")				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	0.90	1.05	0.10 @ 0.50 m
	LFL	3.20	1.17	0.34 @ 2.00 m
	50 % LFL	6.20	0 – 1.32	1.32 @ 3.50 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	5.90	1.6	6	4	0
		4	5	2	0
		9.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (27) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 10" Outlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 6 m downwind and over 1 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 0.90 m downwind with a height of 1.05 m. The cloud large width will be 0.10 m crosswind at a distance of 0.50 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 3.20 m downwind with a height of 1.17 m. The cloud large width will be 0.34 m crosswind at a distance of 2 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 6.20 m downwind with a height of from 0 to 1.32 m. The cloud large width will be 1.32 m crosswind at a distance of 3.50 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with no effects inside.



Figure (28) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 10" Outlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 5.80 meters downwind.
- The 1.6 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 6 meters downwind and 4 meters crosswind.
- The 4 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 5 meters downwind and 2 meters crosswind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation value 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary downwind with no effects.

The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 not determined by the software due to small leakage.

3/2- Consequence Modeling for 5 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (23) Show that:

Table (23) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 5" / 10" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	7.50	1.30	0.60 @ 6.30 m
	LFL	15.55	0 – 2.70	2.70 @ 15.55 m
	50 % LFL	15.60	0 – 3.40	3.40 @ 15.60 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	42.50	1.6	71	48	0
		4	54	30	0
		9.5	43	18	0
		12.5	39	15	20% /60 sec.
		25	32	8	80.34
		37.5	28	4	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (29) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (5" hole in 10" Outlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 5" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 15 m downwind and 3 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 7.50 m downwind with a height of 1.30 m. The cloud large width will be 0.60 m crosswind at a distance of 6.30 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 15.55 m downwind with a height from 0 to 2.70 m. The cloud large width will be 2.70 m crosswind at a distance of 15.55 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 15.60 m downwind with a height from 0 to 3.40 m. The cloud large width will be 3.40 m crosswind at a distance of 15.60 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud (UFL, LFL & 50% LFL) will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching admin and security offices downwind.



Figure (30) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (5" hole in 10" Outlet Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 5" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 42 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 43 meters downwind and 18 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 39 meters downwind and 15 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 32 meters downwind and 8 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 28 meters downwind and 4 meters crosswind.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the PRMS east fence covering the admin office and near to the security office downwind.

3/3- Consequence Modeling for 10 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (24) Show that:

Table (24) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 10" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	13.13	1.70	1.40 @ 9.20 m
	LFL	13.14	0 – 3.15	3.15 @ 13.14 m
	50 % LFL	13.15	0 – 3.60	3.60 @ 13.15 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m²)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	66.90	1.6	126	80	0
		4	89	51	0
		9.5	67	31	0
		12.5	61	25	20% /60 sec.
		25	50	14	80.34
		37.5	41	9	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	54	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	14	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	11	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*

Fireball			
Wind Category	**Heat Radiation (kW/m²)**	**Distance (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m²) Effects on People & Structures**
4.6 D	1.6	68	**12.5** *20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec exposure* **25** *100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure; 50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure* **37.5** *Sufficient of cause process equipment damage*
	4	41	
	9.5	22	
	12.5	17	
	25	Not Reached	
	37.5	Not Reached	



Figure (31) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (10" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 10" pipeline full rupture without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 13 m downwind and over 3 m height.
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 13.13 m downwind with a height of 1.70 m. The cloud large width will be 1.40 m crosswind at a distance of 9.20 m from the source.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 13.14 m downwind with a height from 0 to 3.15 m. The cloud large width will be 3.15 m crosswind at a distance of 13.14 m from the source.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 13.15 m downwind with a height from 0 to 3.60 m. The cloud large width will be 3.60 m crosswind at a distance of 13.15 m from the source.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the heater section.



Figure (32) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (10" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 10" pipeline full rupture and ignited the expected flame length is about 66 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 67 meters downwind and 31 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 61 meters downwind and 25 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 50 meters downwind and 14 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 41 meters downwind and 9 meters crosswind.

The modeling shows that all heat radiation values will extend outside the PRMS SE boundary down and crosswind covering security office and reaching Sharanis road.



Figure (33) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (10" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 10" hole size and early ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 54 meters radius.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 14 meters radius.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 11 meters radius.

The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides and will be near to Sharanis road.

The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and covering the control room.

Figure (34) Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball (10" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 10" pipeline full rupture and ignited forming fireball this will gives a heat radiation with different values and contours and will extend in four dimensions.
- The 1.6 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 68 meters radius.
- The 4 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 41 meters radius.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 22 meters radius.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 17 meters radius.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not reached.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 will cover the PRMS components and extend outside from three sides (N, E &W).

The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with some extension from west side with no effects.

4.0- Pressure Reduction Station Odorant Tank (Spotleak)

The following table no. (25) Show 1" hole leak form odorant Modeling:

Table (25) Dispersion Modeling for Odorant Tank

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	19	0 – 0.35	15
	LFL	25	0 – 0.49	22
	50 % LFL	35.50	0 – 0.73	32

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	16.95	1.6	46	29	0
		4	33	18	0
		9.5	25	12	0
		12.5	23	10	20% /60 sec.
		25	19	7	80.34
		37.5	16	5	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	25	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	14	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	13	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (35) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Side View Graph (Odorant leak)

- The previous figures show that if there is a leak from odorant tank without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 35 m downwind and from 0 to 0.73 m height (the vapors heavier than air).
- The UFL (2.1E+04 ppm) will reach a distance of about 19 m downwind with a height from 0 to 0.35 m. The cloud large width will be 14 m crosswind.
- The LFL (1.4E+04 ppm) will reach a distance of about 25 m downwind with a height from 0 to 0.49 m. The cloud large width will be 22 m crosswind.
- The 50 % LFL (7000 ppm) will reach a distance of about 35.50 m downwind with a height from 0 to 0.73 m. The cloud large width will be 32 m crosswind.

The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will extend inside the PRMS boundary reaching control room crosswind.

Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.



Figure (36) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire Graph (Odorant Leak)



Figure (37) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire on Site (Odorant Leak)

- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from the odorant tank and ignited the expected flame length is about 17 meters downwind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 25 meters downwind and 12 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 23 meters downwind and 10 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 19 meters downwind and 7 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 16 meters downwind and 5 meters crosswind.

The modeling shows that all values of heat radiation (9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the PRMS boundary down and some extension crosswind (9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2).

The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will be near to the control room and downwind.



Figure (38) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves Graph (Odorant Leak)



Figure (39) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves on Site (Odorant Leak)

- The previous figure show that if there is a leak from the odorant tank and late ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 25 meters downwind.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 14 meters downwind.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 13 meters downwind.

The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS boundary from E & W sides with no effects down or upwind and reaching Sharanis road south side.

The values of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS covering the heater and extend some meters outside from east side.

5.0- Pressure Reduction Station Off-Take Pipeline (8 inch)

5/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (26) Show that:

Table (26) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 1" / 8" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	0.085	0.47	0.15
	LFL	0.31	0.48	0.26
	50 % LFL	0.69	0.49	0.30

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	4.90	1.6	20	11	0
		4	10	6	0
		9.5	3	1	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (40) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 8" off-take Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance about 0.69 m downwind and 0.49 m height above ground (the tie-in point is up ground).

- The UFL will reach a distance of about 0.085 m downwind with a height of 0.47 m. The cloud large width will be 0.15 m.

- The LFL will reach a distance of about 0.31 m downwind with a height of 0.48 m. The cloud large width will be 0.26 m.

- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 0.69 m downwind with a height 0.49 m. The cloud large width will be 0.30 m.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.



Figure (41) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 8" off-take Pipeline)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 1" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 4.90 meters height.
- The 1.6 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 20 meters downwind and 11 meters crosswind.
- The 4 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 10 meters downwind and 6 meters crosswind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 3 meters downwind and 1 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not determined.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation not determined.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not determined.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 4 & 9.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the off-take boundary.

The values of 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 not determined by the software as it is very small values.

5/2- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (27) Show that:

Table (27) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 4" / 8" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	0.48	2.56	1.40
	LFL	0.74	2.58	1.60
	50 % LFL	0.84	2.65	1.80

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	32.97	1.6	97	50	0
		4	49	25	0
		9.5	7	6	0.72
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	N/D	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	N/D	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	N/D	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*



Figure (42) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4" hole in 8" off-take Pipeline)

- The previous figure shows that if there is a gas release from 4" hole size without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 0.84 m downwind and 2.65 m height above ground (the tie-in point is up ground).
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 0.48 m downwind with a height of 2.56 m. The cloud large width will be 1.40 m.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 0.74 m downwind with a height of 2.58 m. The cloud large width will be 1.60 m.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 0.84 m downwind with a height 2.65 m. The cloud large width will be 1.80 m.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.



Figure (43) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4" hole in 8" off-take Pipeline)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 4" hole size and ignited the expected flame length is about 33 meters height.
- The 1.6 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 97 meters downwind and 50 meters crosswind.
- The 4 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 49 meters downwind and 25 meters crosswind.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 7 meters downwind and 6 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not determined.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation not determined.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation not determined.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 will extend outside the off-take boundary from all sides reaching (1.6) Sharanis road north side.

The values of 9.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the off-take boundary.

The values of 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 not determined.

5/3- Consequence Modeling for 8 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (28) Show that:

Table (28) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 8" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
4.6 D	UFL	1.60	16	2.60
	LFL	10	36	9.50
	50 % LFL	13.80	38	14.30

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
4.6 D	92.87	1.6	188	115	0
		4	130	73	0
		9.5	95	45	0
		12.5	85	38	20% /60 sec.
		25	68	22	80.34
		37.5	56	15	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**		**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
		Early	**Late**		
4.6 D	0.020	172	N/D	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	45	N/D	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	35	N/D	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*

Fireball			
Wind Category	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2) Effects on People & Structures**
4.6 D	1.6	Not Determined	**12.5** *20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec exposure* **25** *100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure* *50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure* **37.5** *Sufficient of cause process equipment damage*
	4	Not Determined	
	9.5	Not Determined	
	12.5	Not Determined	
	25	Not Determined	
	37.5	Not Determined	



Figure (44) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (8" off-take Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture without ignition the flammable vapors will reach a distance more than 13 m downwind and over 3 m height above ground (the tie-in point is up ground).
- The UFL will reach a distance of about 1.60 m downwind with a height of 16 m. The cloud large width will be 2.60 m.
- The LFL will reach a distance of about 10 m downwind with a height of 36 m. The cloud large width will be 9.50 m.
- The 50 % LFL will reach a distance of about 13.80 m downwind with a height of 38 m. The cloud large width will be 14.30 m.

The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend outside the off-take point with no effects downwind.



Figure (45) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (8" off-take Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" pipeline full rupture and ignited the expected flame length is about 93 meters height.
- The 9.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 95 meters downwind and 45 meters crosswind.
- The 12.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 85 meters downwind and 38 meters crosswind.
- The 25 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 68 meters downwind and 22 meters crosswind.
- The 37.5 kW/m^2 heat radiation contours extend about 56 meters downwind and 15 meters crosswind.

The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the off-take boundary from southeast side downwind with no effects down or crosswind.



Figure (46) Early Explosion Overpressure Waves (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)

- The previous figure show that if there is a gas release from 8" hole size and early ignited this will give an explosion with different values of overpressure waves.
- The 0.020 bar overpressure waves will extend about 172 meters radius.
- The 0.137 bar overpressure waves will extend about 45 meters radius.
- The 0.206 bar overpressure waves will extend about 35 meters radius.

The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will reach the PRMS north side and poultry farm west side.

The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will extend outside the off-take point reaching Sharanis road north side.

Individual Risk Evaluation

- **Risk Calculation**

All identified hazards should be subject to an evaluation for risk potential. This means analyzing the hazard for its probability to actually progress to loss event, as well as likely consequences of this event.

There are four steps to calculate risk, which determined as follows:

1- *Identify failure frequency (International Data Base)*

2- *Calculating the frequency against control measures at site by using Event Tree Analysis "ETA".*

3- *Identify scenarios probability.*

4- *Calculated risk to people regarding to the vulnerability of life loses.*

Basically, risk will be calculated as presented in the following equation:

Risk to people (Individual Risk – IR) =

Total Risk (Σ Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability

Where:

- *Total risk* — *Is the sum of contributions from all hazards exposed to (fire / explosion).*
- *Occupancy* — *Is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards. (Expected that x man the most exposed person to fire/explosion hazards on site. He works 8 hours shift/day)*
- *Vulnerability* — *Is the probability that exposure to the hazard will result in fatality.*

As shown in tables (5 & 6) – (Page: 37 & 38) *the vulnerability of people to heat radiation starting from 12 kW/m^2 will lead to fatality accident for 60 sec. Exposure and for explosion over pressure starting from 0.137 bar.*

The modeling of the different scenarios shows that the heat radiation and overpressure waves would be a result from release scenarios for all sizes of crack and according to the space size for the PRMS, all of the sequence will be determined for three values release (small, medium and large).

Calculating frequencies needs a very comprehensive calculations which needs a lot of data collecting related to failure of equipment's and accident reporting with detailed investigation to know the failure frequency rates in order to calculate risks from scenarios.

In this study, it decided that to use an International Data Bank for major hazardous incident data.

The following table (29) show frequency for each failure can be raised in pressure reduction station operations:

Table (29) Failure Frequency for Each Scenario

Scenario	Release Size	Failure Cause	Failure Rate
Gas Release from 1"/8" - 1"/6" - 1"/10" Pipelines	***Small***	Internal Corrosion	*1.19E-05*
		External Corrosion	*3.55E-06*
		Maintenance Error	*2.28E-05*
		Corrosive Liquid or Gas	*4.84E-04*
		Total	***5.22E-04***
Gas Release from 3"/6" - 4"/8" - 5"/10" Pipelines	***Medium***	Internal Corrosion	*2.71E-05*
		External Corrosion	*8.24E-06*
		Erosion	*4.85E-04*
		Total	***5.20E-04***
Gas Release from 6" / 8" / 10" Pipelines Full Rupture	***Large***	Internal Corrosion	*5.53E-06*
		External Corrosion	*1.61E-06*
		Weld Crack	*4.34E-06*
		Earthquake	*1.33E-07*
		Total	***1.16E-05***
Spotleak (Odorant Tank)	***Medium***	***As a package***	***1.25E-05***

Reference: Taylor Associates ApS - 2006
(Hazardous Materials Release and Accident Frequencies for Process Plant - Volume II / Process Unit Release Frequencies - Version 1 Issue 7)

- **Event Tree Analysis**

An event tree is a graphical way of showing the possible outcomes of a hazardous event, such as a failure of equipment or human error.

An ETA involves determining the responses of systems and operators to the hazardous event in order to determine all possible alternative outcomes.

The result of the ETA is a series of scenarios arising from different sets of failures or errors.

These scenarios describe the possible accident outcomes in terms of the sequence of events (successes or failures of safety functions) that follow the initial hazardous event.

Event trees shall be used to identify the various escalation paths that can occur in the process. After these escalation paths are identified, the specific combinations of failures that can lead to defined outcomes can then be determined.

This allows identification of additional barriers to reduce the likelihood of such escalation.

The results of an ETA are the event tree models and the safety system successes or failures that lead to each defined outcome.

Accident sequences represents in an event tree represent logical and combinations of events; thus, these sequences can be put into the form of a fault tree model for further qualitative analysis.

These results may be used to identify design and procedural weaknesses, and normally to provide recommendations for reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of the analyzed potential accidents.

Using ETA requires knowledge of potential initiating events (that is, equipment failures or system upsets that can potentially cause an accident), and knowledge of safety system functions or emergency procedures that potentially mitigate the effects of each initiating event.

The equipment failures, system upsets and safety system functions shall be extracted from the likelihood data presented before.

In the case of hydrocarbon release, the event tree first branch is typically represents "Early Ignition". These events are represented in the risk analysis as jet fire events.

This is because sufficient time is unlikely to elapse before ignition for a gas/air mixture to accumulate and cause either a flash fire or a gas hazard.

Subsequent branches for these events represent gas detection, fire detection, inventory isolation (or ESD) or deluge activation.

Delayed ignitions are typically represented by the fifth branch event. This is because, in the time taken for an ignition to occur, sufficient time is more likely to elapse for gas detection and inventory isolation.

The scenario development shall be performed for the following cases**:**

- Without any control measures
- With control measures

The outcome from event tree analysis can be classified into three main categories as follows:

"Limited Consequence"	*Indicates that the release has been detected and the inventory source has been isolated automatically.*
"Controlled Consequence"	*Indicates that the release has been detected but the source has not been isolated automatically. [Needs human intervention].*
"Escalated Consequence"	*Indicates that the release has not been detected and consequently the source has not been isolated.*

The event trees analysis for each scenario are presented in the following pages:

Table (30) Off-take 8" / Inlet 6" (Exists) & 8" (New) / Outlet 10" Pipeline Scenarios (Pin Hole Crack – 1" Release) – ETA

Release of Flammable Materials [1]	Immediate Ignition [2]	Fire Detection [3]	ESD System [3]	Fire Protec. [3]	Delayed Ignition [2]	Outcomes	Frequency
5.22E-04	**0.02**	**0.6**	**0.978**	**0.97**	**0.02**		
						Controlled Jet fire	***1.01E-05***
						Not controlled jet fire	***3.13E-07***
						Escalated jet fire	***4.18E-06***
						Limited release	-------------
						Large release	***1.13E-05***
						Escalated jet fire	***1.02E-05***
						Escalated release	***5.01E-04***
						TOTAL	***1.47E-05***



(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 109. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

Table (31) Inlet 6" (Existing PRS) Pipeline Scenarios (Half Rupture Release) – ETA

Release of Flammable Materials [1]	Immediate Ignition [2]	Fire Detection [3]	ESD System [3]	Fire Protec. [3]	Delayed Ignition [2]
5.20E-04	0.02	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.02



Outcomes	Frequency
Controlled Jet fire	***1.01E-05***
Not controlled jet fire	***3.12E-07***
Escalated jet fire	***4.16E-06***
Limited release	-------------
Large release	***1.12E-05***
Escalated jet fire	***1.02E-05***
Escalated release	***4.99E-04***
TOTAL	***1.46E-05***

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 109. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

Table (32) Off-take 8" / Inlet 8" / Outlet 10" Pipeline Scenarios (Half Rupture Release) – ETA

Release of Flammable Materials (1)	Immediate Ignition (2)	Fire Detection (3)	ESD System (3)	Fire Protec. (3)	Delayed Ignition (2)
5.20E-04	0.04	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.04



Outcomes	Frequency
Controlled Jet fire	***2.02E-05***
Not controlled jet fire	***6.24E-07***
Escalated jet fire	***2.08E-04***
Limited release	-------------
Large release	***1.09E-05***
Escalated jet fire	***1.99E-05***
Escalated release	***4.79E-04***
TOTAL	***2.28E-04***

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 109. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

Table (33) Inlet 6" (Existing PRS) Pipeline Scenarios (Full Rupture Release) – ETA

Release of Flammable Materials (1)	Immediate Ignition (2)	Fire Detection (3)	ESD System (3)	Fire Protec. (3)	Delayed Ignition (2)	Outcomes	Frequency
1.16E-05	**0.04**	**0.6**	**0.978**	**0.97**	**0.04**		
1.16E-05	Yes 0.04	Yes 0.6		Yes 0.97		Controlled Jet fire	***4.50E-07***
				No 0.03		Not controlled jet fire	***1.39E-08***
		No 0.4				Escalated jet fire	***1.86E-07***
	No 0.96		Yes 0.978			Limited release	-------------
			No 0.022			Large release	***2.45E-07***
					Yes 0.04	Escalated jet fire	***4.45E-07***
					No 0.96	Escalated release	***1.07E-05***
						TOTAL	***6.45E-07***

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 109. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

Table (34) Off-take 8" / Inlet 8" Pipeline Scenarios (Full Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials [1]	Immediate Ignition [2]	Fire Detection [3]	ESD System [3]	Fire Protec. [3]	Delayed Ignition [2]	Outcomes	Frequency
1.16E-05	**0.09**	**0.6**	**0.978**	**0.97**	**0.1**		



Outcomes	Frequency
Controlled Jet fire	***1.01E-06***
Not controlled jet fire	***3.13E-08***
Escalated jet fire	***4.18E-07***
Limited release	-------------
Large release	***2.32E-07***
Escalated jet fire	***1.06E-06***
Escalated release	***9.50E-06***
TOTAL	***1.51E-06***

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 109. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

Table (35) Inlet 6" / Outlet 10" Pipeline Scenarios (Full Rupture Release) – ETA

Release of Flammable Materials [1]	Immediate Ignition [2]	Fire Detection [3]	ESD System [3]	Fire Protec. [3]	Delayed Ignition [2]	Outcomes	Frequency
1.16E-05	0.04	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.04		



Outcomes	Frequency
Controlled Jet fire	***4.50E-07***
Not controlled jet fire	***1.39E-08***
Escalated jet fire	***1.86E-07***
Limited release	-------------
Large release	***2.45E-07***
Escalated jet fire	***4.45E-07***
Escalated release	***1.07E-05***
TOTAL	***6.45E-07***

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 109. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

Table (36) Odorant Tank Release – ETA

Release of Flammable Materials [1]	Immediate Ignition [2]	Fire Detection [3]	ESD System [3]	Fire Protec. [3]	Delayed Ignition [2]	Outcomes	Frequency
1.25E-05	0.065	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.07		
1.25E-05	Yes 0.065	Yes 0.6		Yes 0.97		Controlled fire	*7.88E-07*
				No 0.03		Large fire	*2.44E-08*
		No 0.4				Escalated fire	*3.25E-07*
	No 0.935		Yes 0.978			Limited leak	-------------
			No 0.022			Large leak	*2.57E-07*
					Yes 0.07	Escalated fire	*8.18E-07*
					No 0.93	Escalated leak	*1.09E-05*
						TOTAL	***1.23E-05***

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 109. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.

The following table (37) show the total frequency for each scenario from ETA - Tables (30 to 36):

Table (37) Total Frequencies for Each Scenario

Source of Release	Total Frequency (ETA)
1" / 6" Inlet Pipeline Pin Hole	***1.47E-05***
1" / 8" Inlet Pipeline Pin Hole	
1" / 10" Outlet Pipeline Pin Hole	
1" / 8" Off-Take Pipeline Pin Hole	
3" / 6" Inlet Pipeline Half Rupture	***1.46E-05***
4" / 8" Inlet Pipeline Half Rupture	***2.28E-04***
5" / 10" Outlet Pipeline Half Rupture	
4" / 8" Off-Take Pipeline Half Rupture	
8" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture	***1.51E-06***
8" Off-Take Pipeline Full Rupture	
6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture	***6.45E-07***
10" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture	
Odorant Tank 1" hole Leak	***1.23E-05***

The following table (38) summarize events that reach workers / public like heat radiation or explosion. These hazards will affect the control room and security office downwind; also, some scenarios will extend outside and reach surroundings (Sharanis road) down and crosswind.

Table No. (38) Summarize the Risk on Workers / Public (Occupancy)

Inlet 6" Pipeline Release Scenarios (Existing PRS)					
	Event	Jet / Pool Fire (12.5 kW/m^2)		Explosion Overpressure (0.137 bar)	
	Exposure	Workers	Public	Workers	Public
Pin Hole	1"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Half Rupture	3"	*2 for 24 h (2)*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Full Rupture	6"	*3 for 24 h (3)*	*10 for 5 sec.(0.014)*	*2 for 24 h (2)*	*None*
Inlet 8" Pipeline Release Scenarios (New PRS)					
Pin Hole	1"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Half Rupture	4"	*1 for 24 h (1)*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Full Rupture	8"	*1 for 24 h (1)*	*10 for 5 sec.(0.014)*	*3 for 24 h (3)*	*None*
Outlet 10" Pipeline Release Scenarios (Existing & New PRS)					
Pin Hole	1"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Half Rupture	5"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Full Rupture	10"	*1 for 24 h (1)*	*10 for 5 sec.(0.014)*	*2 for 24 h (2)*	*None*
Odorant Tank Release Scenario					
Small Leak	1"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Off-Take 8" Pipeline Release Scenarios					
Pin Hole	1"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Half Rupture	4"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*None*
Full Rupture	8"	*None*	*None*	*None*	*10 for 5 sec.(0.014)*

Therefore, the risk calculation will depend on total risk from these scenarios, and as per the equation page (107):

Risk to People (Individual Risk – IR) =

Total Risk (Σ Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability

Where:

- Total risk - is the sum of contributions from all hazards exposed to (fire / explosion).

(Frequencies of Scenarios from Table-37)

- Occupancy - is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards. (Expected that X man the most exposed person to fire/explosion hazards on site. He works 8 hours "shift/day").

(As per Egypt Gas data, Qwesna PRMS Occupancy is 3 persons / 24 hours)

(As per Site Visit to PRMS location, the most exposed people are 10 persons for 5 sec. during passing on front of PRMS)

(For the Off-take point, the most exposed people are 10 persons for 5 sec. passing on front of the off-take point)

- Vulnerability - is the probability that exposure to the hazard will result in fatality.

(Reference: Report No./DNV Reg. No.: 2013-4091/1/17 TLT 29-6 – Rev. 1)

As per modeling, the IR will be calculated for the workers and the public around the PRMS and Off-Take Point (public passing on front of) as per the following tables (39, 40 & 41):

Table (39) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the Off-Take

Source of Event	Frequency 1	Heat Radiation kW/m^2 & Overpressure	Vulnerability 2	Time Exposed 3	IR = 1 x 2 x 3
Gas release from 8" off-take point	1.51E-06	Explosion 0.137	0.1 (Outdoor)	10 Pers. 0.014	***2.11E-09***
TOTAL Risk for the Public (Off-Take Point)					***2.11E-09***

Table (40) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for PRMS Workers

Source of Event	Frequency 1	Heat Radiation kW/m^2 & Overpressure	Vulnerability 2	Time Exposed 3	IR = 1 x 2 x 3
Gas Release from 4"/8" inlet pipeline	2.28E-04	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	1 1 Pers.	***2.28E-05***
Gas Release from 3"/6" inlet pipeline	1.46E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	2 2 Pers.	***2.92E-06***
Gas Release from 6" inlet pipeline	6.45E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	3 3 Pers.	***1.94E-07***
		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Indoor)	2 2 Pers.	***3.87E-07***
Gas Release from 8" inlet pipeline	1.51E-06	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	1 1 Pers.	***1.51E-07***
		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Indoor)	3 3 Pers.	***1.36E-06***
Gas Release from 10" outlet pipeline	6.45E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.1 (Indoor)	1 1 Pers.	***6.45E-08***
		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Indoor)	2 2 Pers.	***3.87E-07***
TOTAL Risk for Worker					***2.83E-05***

Table (41) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the PRMS

Source of Event	Frequency 1	Heat Radiation kW/m² & Overpressure	Vulnerability 2	Time Exposed 3	IR = 1 x 2 x 3
Gas Release from 6" inlet pipeline	6.45E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	10 Pers. 0.014	*6.32E-09*
Gas Release from 10" outlet pipeline	6.45E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	10 Pers. 0.014	*6.32E-09*
TOTAL Risk for the Public (PRMS)					***1.26E-08***



Figure (47) Evaluation of Individual Risk

The level of Individual Risk to the exposed workers at Qwesna PRMS, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is ***ALARP***.

The level of Individual Risk to the exposed Public at Qwesna PRMS area, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is ***Acceptable***.

The level of Individual Risk to the exposed Public at Qwesna Off-Take area, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is ***Acceptable***.

Summary of Modeling Results and Conclusion

As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario, the following table summarize the study, and as follows:

Event	Scenario	Effects
Pin hole (1") gas release 6" inlet pipeline (Existing PRS)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching the new PRS facilities down and crosswind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary covering some of new PRS facilities down and crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Half rupture (3") gas release 6" inlet pipeline (Existing PRS)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to cover the new PRS facilities and reaching the admin office downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the PRMS eastern fence down and crosswind. The value of 12.5 kW/m^2 will cover the control room downwind and reaching the heater crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
Full rupture gas release 6" inlet pipeline (Existing PRS)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (UF, LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend over eastern fence and covers the PRMS new facilities and control room downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m² will extend outside the eastern fence covering the admin and security offices and reaching Sharanis road downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS covering the outside roads and reaching the poultry farm SW side.* *The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will cover the control room and extend outside the PRMS from east and west sides.*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*N/D*
Pin hole (1") gas release 8" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m² 12.5 kW/m²	*The modeling shows that the all values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary. The 4 & 9.5 kW/m² values will be near to the heater crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
Half rupture (4") gas release 8" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the admin and security offices downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the PRMS SE fence downwind. The value of 12.5 kW/m^2 will cover the heater crosswind and reaching the offices downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Full rupture gas release 8" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects (UF, LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend over SE corner and covers the PRMS offices down and crosswind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the SE fence covering the admin and security offices and Sharanis road down and crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS covering the outside roads and reaching the poultry farm SW side.* *The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will extend outside the PRMS from E & W sides and covers the PRMS offices.*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*N/D*
Pin hole (1") gas release 10" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with no effects inside.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary downwind with no effects.* *The values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 not determined by the software due to small leakage.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Half rupture (5") gas release 10" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (UFL, LFL & 50% LFL) will be limited inside the PRMS boundary reaching admin and security offices downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will extend outside the PRMS east fence covering the admin office and near to the security office downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Full rupture gas release 10" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and near to the heater section.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that all heat radiation values will extend outside the PRMS SE boundary down and crosswind covering the admin and security offices and reaching Sharanis road.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will cover the PRMS components and extend outside the boundary from all sides and will be near to Sharanis road.* *The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS boundary and covering the control room.*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 will cover the PRMS components and extend outside from three sides (N, E &W).* *The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the PRMS boundary with some extension from west side with no effects.*
Odorant tank 1" leak		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will extend inside the PRMS boundary reaching control room crosswind.* *Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that all values of heat radiation (9.5, 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the PRMS boundary down and some extension crosswind (9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2).* *The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m^2 will be near to the control room and downwind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRMS boundary from E & W sides with no effects down or upwind and reaching Sharanis road south side.* *The values of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRMS covering the heater and extend some meters outside from east side.*
Pin hole (1") gas release 8" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 4 & 9.5 kW/m2 will be limited inside the off-take boundary.* *The values of 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m2 not determined by the software as it is very small values.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*

Event	Scenario	Effects
Half rupture (4") gas release 8" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the off-take boundary.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 & 4 kW/m^2 will extend outside the off-take boundary from all sides reaching (1.6) Sharanis road north side.* *The values of 9.5 kW/m^2 will be limited inside the off-take boundary.* *The values of 12.5, 25 & 37.5 kW/m^2 not determined.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
Full rupture gas release 8" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	*The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend outside the off-take point with no effects downwind.*
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the off-take boundary from southeast side downwind with no effects down or crosswind.*
	Early explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will reach the PRMS north side and poultry farm west side.* *The values of 0.137 bar and 0.206 bar will extend outside the off-take point reaching Sharanis road north side.*

Event	Scenario	Effects
	Late explosion *0.020 bar* *0.137 bar* *0.206 bar*	*N/D*
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m^2 12.5 kW/m^2	*N/D*

The previous table show that there are some potential hazards with heat radiation resulting from jet fire, and overpressure waves in case of gas release and early ignited.

These hazards will affect the control room and security office downwind; also, some scenarios will extend over the site boundary like heat radiation of 12.5 kW/m^2 and overpressure waves (0.137 & 0.206 bar) reaching surroundings (Sharanis road) down and crosswind.

Regarding to the results from risk calculations; the risk to ***PRMS Worker found in ALARP Region, Public for PRMS and Off-Take Point found in Acceptable Region,*** so there are some points need to be considered to keep the risk tolerability and this will be describe in the following recommendations.

Recommendations

Regarding to the risk calculations to workers / public which found in ALARP and Acceptable region, therefore there are some points need to be considered to reduce or maintain the risk tolerability in its region and this will be describe in the following recommendations:

Recommendation	Timeline Phases	Egypt Gas Remarks
PRMS Lay-out and Plant Siting		
• From view of safety, it is recommended that to relocate the control room and security office to be: - At the east corner with respects to some points (refer to figure 48 - page 135); or - At the west corner with respects to some points (refer to figure 49 - page 135); or - Control room as it is and to be designed according to specific area (refer to graph page - 136). • According to the updated layout received from Egypt Gas "Annex-1"; which is proposed as the above choices are not applicable; it is recommended to take into consideration that Control Room "C.R." should be designed to be Fire Resistant as well as Explosion Proof. Also, all edges of the C.R. building facing the PRMS should be with no openings, windows should be with minimal space and shatterproof glass.	Design	
• The PRMS updated planned layout received from Egypt Gas "Annex-1" need to be re-drawn as there are some items not determined like:	Design	
- Security office; (should be designed similar to C.R.)		
- Auxiliary gates; (as per discussions with Egypt Gas, the auxiliary gate will be on the southern side of the PRMS facing the new location of C.R.).		
- Emergency gates; (as per discussions with Egypt Gas, the emergency gate will be on the northern side of the PRMS).		
- Firefighting facilities (as per meeting dated 20/07/2016 with Civil Protection);		
- Outside roads and pathways;		
- Redefine the north direction. (to be at the oppsite direction)		

Recommendation	Timeline Phases	Egypt Gas Remarks
Facilities and Operations		
• Ensure that		
- All PRMS facilities specifications referred to the national and international codes and standards.	Design	
- Inspection and maintenance plans and programs are according to the manufacturers guidelines to keep all facility parts in a good condition.	Operation	
- All operations are according to standard operating procedures for the PRMS operations and training programs in-place for operators.	Operation	
- Emergency shutdown detailed procedure including emergency gas isolation points at the PRMS and Off-Take Point in place.	Operation	
- Surface drainage system is suitable for containment any odorant spillage.	Design	
• Considering that all electrical equipment, facilities and connections are according to the hazardous area classification for natural gas facilities.	Design	
Emergency Preparedness and Planning		
• Review the emergency response plan and update the plan to include all scenarios in this study and other needs including:	Operation	
- Firefighting brigades, mutual aids, emergency communications and fire detection / protection systems.	Operation	
- Dealing with the external road in case of major fires.	Operation	
- First aid including dealing with the odorant according to the MSDS for it, with respect of means of water supply for emergency showers, eye washers and cleaning.	Operation	
- Safe exits in offices according to the modeling in this study.	Design	
• Provide the site with SCBA "Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus" (at least two sets) and arrange training programs for operators.	Operation	
• Provide a suitable tool for wind direction (Windsock) to be installed in a suitable place to determine the wind direction (the PRMS layout need to be reviewed for wind direction correction)	Construction	
PRMS Area Surrounding		
• Cooperation should be done with the concerned parties before planning for housing projects around the PRMS area.	Operation / Design / Construction	

Figure (48) First Suggestion for Relocation of control room, security office and firefighting facility



Taking in cosidration the following points:

- *Control room evacuation (safe exits / routes) and wind direction and modeling.*
- *Spacing in between refering to national / international standards.*
- *Gates distribution (Main gate for rutine entrance / emergency gate for evacuation of control room / auxilary gate for firefighting facilities / emergency gate upwind from facilities).*

Figure (49) Second Suggestion for Relocation of control room, security office and firefighting facility



Taking in cosidration the following points:

- *Control room evacuation (safe exits / routes) considering wind direction and modeling.*
- *Spacing in between refering to national / international standards.*
- *Gates distribution (Main gate for rutine entrance / emergency gate for evacuation of control room / auxilary gate for firefighting facilities / emergency gate upwind from facilities).*



Figure (50) Summary of the Main Restriction on Design Imposed by Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosions *(Ref. Fire Protection Manual)*

Annex “1”

Results of Consequence Modeling for Low Wind Scenario

Results of Consequence Modeling for Low Wind Scenario

1.0- Existing Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (6 inch)

1/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (A.1) Show that:

Table (A.1) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 1" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
3 F	UFL	1.80	1.05	0.1 @ 1.00 m
	LFL	6.2	1.3	0.6 @ 4.00 m
	50 % LFL	12.2	1.6	1.3 @ 8.00 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
3 F	10.21	1.6	16	10.4	0
		4	13.3	6.3	0
		9.5	11.1	3.3	0
		12.5	10.35	2.4	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire				
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**	**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
3 F	0.020	13	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	3.4	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	2.6	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*

Note: *(As per licensor reply)*

The early explosion results are no longer shown in the recent versions of PHAST (Starting from Ver. 8.0) to simplify the reporting for the explosions.

1/2- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (A.2) Show that:

Table (A.2) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 3" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
3 F	UFL	6.8	1.40	1.00 @ 3.00 m
	LFL	35	0 – 2.80	2.80 @ 20.00 m
	50 % LFL	64	0 – 4.8	4.80 @ 40.00 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
3 F	34.37	1.6	60	41	0
		4	48.3	26	0
		9.5	40	15.2	0
		12.5	37	12	20% /60 sec.
		25	32.6	5.9	80.34
		37.5	25.2	3.1	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire				
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**	**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
3 F	0.020	68	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	17.6	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	13.5	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*

1/3- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rupture) Gas Release

The following table no. (A.3) Show that:

Table (A.3) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 6" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	**Flammability Limits**	**Distance (m)**	**Height (m)**	**Cloud Width (m)**
3 F	UFL	18	2.00	2.00 @ 10.00 m
	LFL	58	0 – 5.00	5.00 @ 35.00 m
	50 % LFL	74	0 – 6.80	6.80 @ 40.00 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	**Flame Length (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance Downwind (m)**	**Distance Crosswind (m)**	**Lethality Level (%)**
3 F	65.7	1.6	122.6	85	0
		4	96	53.5	0
		9.5	75.8	32	0
		12.5	71	26.5	20 %/60 sec.
		25	61	14.2	80.34
		37.5	50	9.2	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air) - Flash Fire				
Wind Category	**Pressure Value (bar)**	**Over Pressure Radius (m)**	**Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage**	
3 F	0.020	151	**0.021 bar**	*Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken*
	0.137	34.5	**0.137 bar**	*Some severe injuries, death unlikely*
	0.206	26.7	**0.206 bar**	*Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation*

Fireball			
Wind Category	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2)**	**Distance (m)**	**Heat Radiation (kW/m^2) Effects on People & Structures**
3 F	1.6	Not Determined	**12.5** *20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec exposure*
	4	Not Determined	**25** *100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure; 50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure*
	9.5	Not Determined	**37.5** *Sufficient of cause process equipment damage*
	12.5	Not Determined	
	25	Not Determined	
	37.5	Not Determined	