



The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"

Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study For Dekerness Pressure Reduction Station



Prepared By
Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company
PETROSAFE

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Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"

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Executive Summary

This report summarizes the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) analysis study undertaken for the New Natural Gas Pressure Reduction & Metering Station "PRMS" with Odorant at Dekerness City – Dakahleyia Governorate – Egypt. The PRMS owned by The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS" and operated by Egypt Gas Company.

The scope of work includes performing frequency assessment, consequence modeling analysis and Quantitative Risk Assessment of Dekerness PRMS in order to assess its impacts on the surroundings.

The main objective of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study is to demonstrate that Individual Risk "IR" for workers and for public fall within the ALARP region of Risk Acceptance Criteria, and the new Dekerness PRMS does not lead to any unacceptable risks to workers or the public.

QRA Study has been undertaken in accordance with the methodology outlined in the UKHSE as well as international regulations and standards.

QRA starts by Hazard Identification (HAZID) study, which determines the Major Accident Hazards (MAH) that requires consequence modelling, frequency analysis, and risk calculation.

In order to perform consequence-modelling analysis of the potential hazardous scenarios resulting from loss of containment, some assumptions and design basis have been proposed. Four scenarios of the release have been proposed:

1. Gas Release from the inlet / outlet pipeline.
2. Gas Release from the off-take point.
3. Leak from odorant tank.
4. Leak from waterbath heater.

The QRA has been performed using DNV Phast software (Ver. 8.61) for consequence modelling of different types of hazardous consequences.

Weather conditions have been selected based on wind speed and stability class for the area detailed weather statistics.

The worst case weather conditions have been selected represented by wind speed of 3.4 m/s and stability class "D" representing "Neutral" weather conditions, in order to obtain conservative results. The prevailing wind direction is North (N), North West (NW) & North North West (NNW).

Additional scenario was discussed to highlight the effect of different weather conditions "low wind speed", where the differences between the two weather conditions were negligible. Please refer to Annex "1" for additional scenario.

As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario, the following table summarize the study, and as follows:



Event	Scenario	Effects
Pin hole (1") gas release 6" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will be limited inside the PES boundary with no effects</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the overpressure waves will be limited inside the PRS boundary and some extension (0.02 bar) outside from south side with no effect.</i>
Half Rupture (3") gas release 6" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the southern fence and extend outside. The UFL will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation effects will extend outside the PRS southern fence downwind with no effects.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
Full Rupture gas release 6" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the southern fence and extend outside. The UFL will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation effects will extend outside the PRS southern fence downwind with no effects.</i>



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Event	Scenario	Effects
	Explosion overpressure 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
Pin hole (1") gas release 8" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will be limited inside the PEMS boundary with no effects</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
Half Rupture (4") gas release 8" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the PRMS boundary south east side with no effects downwind.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRMS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
Full Rupture gas release 8" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the PRMS boundary south east side with no effects downwind.</i>



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Event	Scenario	Effects
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 4, 12.5 & 37.5 kW/m² will limited inside the PRS boundary affecting the PRS facilities with some extension of (4 kW/m²) downwind outside from south east side.</i>
Odorant tank 1" leak		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will extend outside the PRS fence from the north east side with no effects downwind. Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that heat radiation values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary down and crosswind.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will be near to the control room, reaching firefighting facilities and extend outside the PRS boundary with no effects. The values of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will be extended outside the PRS boundary with no effect down or crosswind.</i>
Gas heater (water bath heating system)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that all values of heat radiation will be limited inside the PRS boundary down and crosswind.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRS fence from the east side with no effects. The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRS boundary with no effects inside.</i>



Event	Scenario	Effects
Pin hole (1") gas release 6" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the offtake boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 & 4 kW/m² will extend outside PRS from north side with no effects. The value of 9.5 kW/m² will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
Half Rupture (3") gas release 6" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the Offtake boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 1.6 & 4 kW/m² will reach and covers the security office and extend outside boundary from north and west side to reach the road. The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m² will be inside the boundary and extend from north side with no effects.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
Full Rupture gas release 6" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the Offtake boundary with some extension outside from south side downwind.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 1.6 & 4 kW/m² will reach and covers security office, control room and extend outside boundary from west side to reach the road. The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m² will be inside the boundary and extend from north side with no effects.</i>



Event	Scenario	Effects
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D

The previous table shows that there are no direct effects on PRMS workers or surrounding public, so it will be assumed that one person (as public) works as farmer for 1 hour / day light, And one operator (as worker) for operation / maintenance inside the PRS boundary for 2 hours / day light.

The major hazards that extend over site boundary and/or effect on workers / public were used for Risk Calculations.

Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is an analysis technique for identifying and evaluating the sequence of events in a potential accident scenario following the occurrence of an initiating event. ETA utilizes a visual logic tree structure known as an event tree (ET). ETA provides a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the risk associated with each potential outcome. ETA has been used for scenario development.

The following data and assumptions have been considered in the Event tree analysis (ETA):

- Failure frequency data (mainly E&P Forum/OGP),
- Risk reduction factors (if available),
- Ignition probabilities (both immediate and delayed),
- Vulnerability data.

Risks have been assessed for workers / public using International Risk Management Guidelines as a reference.

The resulting risks have been compared with International Risk Acceptance Criteria.

Risk evaluation for Individual Risk "IR" for the major hazards presented in the following tables:



Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for PRMS Workers

Scenario	Event	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas Release from 1 ¹ / ₆ "- 8" Pipeline / 3" Gas Heater	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>8.23E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
	Explosion	Outdoor	<i>3.53E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 3 ¹ / ₆ Pipeline	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>8.23E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 4 ¹ / ₈ " Pipeline	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>1.62E-06</i>	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 8" Pipeline Full Rupture	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>3.61E-08</i>	Acceptable (√)
Odorant tank 1" leak	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>6.89E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
TOTAL Risk for Worker			<i>4.34E-06</i>	Acceptable (√)

Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the PRMS


Scenario	Event	People	Individual Risk "IR"	Acceptability Criteria
Gas Release from 3 ¹ / ₆ " inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>4.12E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
	Explosion	Outdoor	<i>1.76E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 4 ¹ / ₈ " outlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>8.10E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
	Explosion	Outdoor	<i>3.47E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 6" inlet pipeline	Jet Fire	Outdoor	<i>1.81E-08</i>	Acceptable (√)
Gas Release from 8" outlet pipeline	Explosion	Outdoor	<i>7.74E-09</i>	Acceptable (√)
Odorant tank 1" leak	Explosion	Outdoor	<i>1.48E-07</i>	Acceptable (√)
TOTAL Risk for Worker			<i>1.92E-06</i>	Acceptable (√)



The previous table shows that some of direct effects on PRMS workers, and as there is no direct effects on public around the PRMS. Therefore, it will be assumed that 10 persons (as public) works as farmer for 1 hour / day light, And one operator (as worker) for operation / maintenance inside the PRS boundary for 2 hours / day light. (Refer to table 33).

Regarding to the results from risk calculations; the risk to PRMS **Workers and Public found in Acceptable Region**, so there are some points need to be considered to keep the risk tolerability and this will be described in the following recommendations.

The following figure shows the Individual Risk "IR" for Dekerness PRMS and Off-Take point:



Evaluation of Individual Risk

Figure (48) Evaluation of Individual Risk

The level of Individual Risk to the exposed workers at Dekerness PRMS, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is Acceptable.

The level of Individual Risk to the exposed Public at Dekerness PRMS area, based on the risk tolerability criterion used is Acceptable.



Introduction

The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS" has engaged Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company "PETROSAFE" to identify and evaluate hazards generated from the "New Natural Gas Pressure Reduction and Odorant Station – PRMS" at Dekerness City – Dakahleyia Governorate – Egypt. The PRMS operated by Egypt Gas Company in order to advice protective measures for minimizing risk up to acceptable level.

As part of this review, a QRA study conducted for the following objectives:

- Identify hazardous scenarios related to the most critical unexpected event(s).
- Determine the likelihood of the identified scenarios;
- Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
- Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified hazardous scenarios.

The proposed study should also identify existing arrangements for the prevention of major accidents and their mitigation. This would involve emergency plan and procedure for dealing with such events.

PETROSAFE selected to carry out this study, as it has the experience in conducting this type of work.

PETROSAFE is also empowered by the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation "EGPC" to identify and evaluate factors that relate to Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection.



Technical Definitions

ALARP	<i>Stands for "As Low As Reasonably Practicable", and is a term often used in the milieu of safety-critical and safety-involved systems. The ALARP principle is that the residual risk shall be as low as reasonably practicable.</i>
API	<i>American Petroleum Institute.</i>
Confinement	<i>A qualitative or quantitative measure of the enclosure or partial enclosure areas where vapors cloud may be contained.</i>
Congestion	<i>A qualitative or quantitative measure of the physical layout, spacing, and obstructions within a facility that promote development of a vapor cloud explosion.</i>
DNV PHAST	<i>Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool "PHAST" established by Det Norske Veritas "DNV". Phast examines the progress of a potential incident from the initial release to far-field dispersion including modelling of pool spreading and evaporation, and flammable and toxic effects.</i>
E&P Forum	<i>Exploration and Production "E&P" Forum is the international association of oil companies and petroleum industry organizations formed in 1974. It was established to represent its members' interests at the specialized agencies of the United Nations, governmental and other international bodies concerned with regulating the exploration and production of oil and gas.</i>
EGAS	<i>The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company.</i>
EGPC	<i>The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation.</i>
EX	<i>Explosion Proof Type Equipment.</i>
EERA	<i>Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment.</i>
ESD	<i>Emergency Shut Down.</i>
Explosion	<i>Explosion is the delayed ignition of gas in a confined or congested area resulting in high overpressure waves. Once the explosion occurs, it creates a blast wave that has a very steep pressure rise at the wave front and a blast wind that is a transient flow behind the blast wave. The impact of the blast wave</i>



on structure near the explosion known as blast loading. The two important aspects of the blast loading concern are the prediction of the magnitude of the blast and of the pressure loading onto the local structures. Pressure loading predication as result of a blast; resemble a pulse of trapezoidal or triangular shape. They normally have duration of between approximately 40 msec and 400 msec. The time to maximum pressure is typically 20 msec.

Primary damage from an explosion may result from several events:

- 1. Overpressure - the pressure developed between the expanding gas and its surrounding atmosphere.*
- 2. Pulse - the differential pressure across a plant as a pressure wave passes might cause collapse or movement, both positive and negative.*
- 3. Missiles and Shrapnel - are whole or partial items that are thrown by the blast of expanding gases that might cause damage or event escalation. In general, these "missiles" from atmospheric vapor cloud explosions cause minor impacts to process equipment since insufficient energy is available to lift heavy objects and cause major impacts. Small projectile objects are still a hazard to personnel and may cause injuries and fatalities. Impacts from rupture incidents may produce catastrophic results.*

(ETA)
Event Tree
Analysis

Is a forward, bottom up, logical modeling technique for both success and failure that explores responses through a single initiating event and lays a path for assessing probabilities of the outcomes and overall system analysis. This analysis technique used to analyze the effects of functioning or failed systems, given that an event has occurred.

Failure Rate

Is the frequency with which an engineered system or component fails, expressed in failures per unit of time. It is highly used in reliability engineering.

GASCO

The Egyptian Natural Gas Company.

Gas Cloud
Dispersion

Gas cloud air dilution naturally reduces the concentration to below the LEL or no longer considered ignitable (typically defined as 50 % of the LEL).



HSE Policy	<i>Health, Safety and Environmental Policy.</i>
Hazard	<i>An inherent physical or chemical characteristic (flammability, toxicity, corrosively, stored chemical or mechanical energy) or set of conditions that has the potential for causing harm to people, property, or the environment.</i>
(HAZOP) Hazard and Operability Study	<i>Is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. The HAZOP technique is qualitative, and aims to stimulate the imagination of participants to identify potential hazards and operability problems; structure and completeness given by using guideword prompts.</i>
(HAZID) Hazard Identification Study	<i>Is a tool for hazard identification, used early in a project as soon as process flow diagrams, draft heat and mass balances, and plot layouts are available. Existing site infrastructure, weather, and Geotechnical data also required, these being a source of external hazards.</i>
(HAC) Hazardous Area Classification	<i>When electrical equipment is used in, around, or near an atmosphere that has flammable gases or vapors, flammable liquids, combustible dusts, ignitable fibers or flying's, there is always a possibility or risk that a fire or explosion might occur. Those areas where the possibility or risk of fire or explosion might occur due to an explosive atmosphere and/or mixture is often called a hazardous (or classified) location/area.</i>
(IR) Individual Risk	<i>The risk to a single person inside a particular building. Maximum individual risk is the risk to the most-exposed person and assumes that the person is exposed.</i>
Jet Fire	<i>A jet fire is a pressurized stream of combustible gas or atomized liquid (such as a high-pressure release from a gas pipe or wellhead blowout event) that is burning. If such a release is ignited soon after it occurs, (i.e., within 2 - 3 minutes), the result is an intense jet flame. This jet fire stabilizes to a point that is close to the source of release, until the release stopped. A jet fire is usually a very localized, but very destructive to anything close to it. This is partly because as well as producing thermal radiation, the jet fire causes considerable convective heating in the region</i>



	<p><i>beyond the tip of the flame. The high velocity of the escaping gas entrains air into the gas "jet" causing more efficient combustion to occur than in pool fires.</i></p> <p><i>Consequentially, a much higher heat transfer rate occurs to any object immersed in the flame, i.e., over 200 kW/m² (62,500 Btdsq. ft) for a jet fire than in a pool fire flame. Typically, the first 10% of a jet fire length is conservatively considered un-ignited gas, as a result of the exit velocity causing the flame to lift off the gas point of release. This effect has been measured on hydrocarbon facility flares at 20% of the jet length, but a value of 10% is used to account for the extra turbulence around the edges of a real release point as compared to the smooth gas release from a flare tip. Jet flames have a relatively cool core near the source. The greatest heat flux usually occurs at impingement distances beyond 40% of the flame length, from its source. The greatest heat flux is not necessarily on the directly impinged side.</i></p>
kW/m ²	<i>Kilowatt per square meter – unit for measuring the heat radiation (or heat flux).</i>
LFL / LEL	<i>Lower Flammable Limit / Lower Explosive Limit - The lowest concentration (percentage) of a gas or a vapor in air capable of producing a flash of fire in presence of an ignition source.</i>
MSDS	<i>Material Safety Data Sheet.</i>
mm Hg	<i>A millimeter of mercury is a manometric unit of pressure, formerly defined as the extra pressure generated by a column of mercury one millimeter high.</i>
MEL	<i>Maximum Exposure Limit.</i>
NFPA	<i>National Fire Protection Association.</i>
N	<i>North Direction.</i>
NE	<i>Northern East Direction.</i>
NW	<i>Northern West Direction.</i>
N/D	<i>Not Determined. (It means not getting results from the software's calculations)</i>



N/R	<i>Not Reached. (It means the resulting consequence doesn't reach the surrounding receptors "if any")</i>
OGP	<i>Oil and Gas Producers.</i>
ppm	<i>Part Per Million.</i>
PRMS	<i>Pressure Reduction and Metering Station.</i>
P&ID's	<i>Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams.</i>
PETROSAFE	<i>Petroleum Safety and Environmental Services Company.</i>
QRA	<i>Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is a formal and systematic approach to estimating the likelihood and consequences of hazardous events, and expressing the results quantitatively as risk to people, the environment or your business.</i>
Risk	<i>Relates to the probability of exposure to a hazard, which could result in harm to personnel, the environment or public. Risk is a measure of potential for human injury or economic loss in terms of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the injury / loss.</i>
Risk Assessment	<i>The identification and analysis, either qualitative or quantitative, of the likelihood and outcome of specific events or scenarios with judgments of probability and consequences.</i>
scm/hr	<i>Standard Cubic Meter Per Hour.</i>
SCBA	<i>Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus.</i>
SE	<i>Southern East Direction.</i>
SW	<i>Southern West Direction.</i>
TWA	<i>Time Weighted Averages.</i>
UFL/UEL	<i>Upper flammable limit, the flammability limit describing the richest flammable mixture of a combustible gas.</i>
UVCE	<i>When a flammable vapor is released, its mixture with air will form a flammable vapor cloud. If ignited, the flame speed may accelerate to high velocities and produce significant blast overpressure.</i>
V	<i>Volume.</i>
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)	<i>An explosion in air of a flammable material cloud.</i>



Objectives

The objectives of this QRA for the unit facilities are:

- Identify hazardous scenarios related to the facilities based on historical data recorded;
- Determine the likelihood (frequencies) of the identified scenarios;
- Model the potential consequences of the identified scenarios;
- Determine the Potential risk of fatality resulting from the identified hazardous scenarios;
- Evaluate the risk against the acceptable risk level to ensure that it is within As Low As Reasonably Practicable "ALARP", otherwise additional control measures and recommendations will be provided at this study to reduce the Risk, (*ALARP*).



Quantitative Risk Assessment Study Scope

The scope of work of this QRA study is limited to the following:

- Identification of the Most Critical Event_(s) or scenarios that may lead to fatal accidents as well as to ensure that the expected risk will not exceed the Acceptable Risk Level as per national and international standards;
- To assess and quantify the risks associated with Dekerness PRMS and the off-take point on the neighboring / surrounding community;
- The study determines Frequencies, Consequences (Including Associated Effect Contours) and Potential Risk of Fatality for the identified hazardous scenarios;
- Normal operation of the facilities (e.g., Construction and specific maintenance activities) are excluded from this analysis.



Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Studies

Method of Assessment

1.0- General Method Used

Attention mainly focussed on those accidents where a gross failure of containment could result in the generation of a large vapour cloud of flammable or toxic material. The approach adopted has involved the following stages:

- Identification of hazardous materials,
- Establishment of maximum total inventories and location.

During the site visit by the study team, the overall functioning of the site discussed in some detail and the Companies asked to provide a complete list of holdings of hazardous materials. A preliminary survey notes was issued by the team, as a private communication to the company concerned, and this formed the basis for subsequent more discussion and analysis.

From the PRMS design model provided by the client, it was impractical to examine in depth all possible failure modes for all parts within the time allowed for this study. Instead, only those potential failures, which might contribute, either directly or indirectly, to off-site risks were examined.

2.0- Risk Assessment

As the PRMS designed and prepared for construction, so it was therefore necessary for the study team to identify and analyse the hazards potential from first principles the routes by which a single or multiple accident could affect the community or neighbouring.

The terms of reference required the team to investigate and determine the overall risk to health and safety both from individual installations and then foreseeable interactions.

The assessment of risk in a complex situation is difficult. No method is perfect as all have advantages and limitations.

It was agreed that the quantitative approach was the most meaningful way of comparing and evaluating different risks. The risk assessment framework shown in Figure (1) used for the study.




Figure (1) Risk Assessment Framework



Modeling the Consequences

Modeling of the consequences is one of the key steps in Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA", as it provides the link between hazard identification (in this study Potential Loss of Containment Incidents) and the determination of possible impact of those incidents on People (Worker / Public), Asset and the Environment.

In this study, Natural Gas (Mainly Methane CH₄) was considered. There are several types of consequences to be considered for modelling, these include Gas Dispersion (UFL - LFL - 50 % LFL) / Heat Radiation / Explosion Overpressure modeling, also each of these scenarios described in the following table:

Table (1) Description of Modeling of the Different Scenario

Discharge Modeling	<i>Modeling of the mass release rate and its variation overtime.</i>
Radiation Modeling	<i>Modeling of the thermal radiation from fires.</i>
Dispersion Modeling	<i>Modeling of the gas and two-phase releases.</i>
Overpressure	<i>Associated with explosions or pressure burst.</i>

Toxic hazards are considered as result of releases / loss of containment for which discharge modeling and gas dispersion modeling are required. The hazard ranges are dependent upon the condition of the release pressure and rate of release.

There are a number of commercial software for modeling gas dispersion, fire, explosion and toxic releases. PETROSAFE select the DNV PHAST Ver. 8.61 Software package in modeling scenarios.

The software developed by DNV in order to provide a standard and validated set of consequence models that can be used to predict the effects of a release of hydrocarbon or chemical liquid or vapour. (Results of the modeling presented in pages from 53 to 97)



Criterion for Risk Tolerability

The main function of this phase of the work was to assess the effectiveness of the proposed arrangement for managing risks against performance standards.

In order to do this, we need firstly to define a performance standard and secondly, to be able to analyse the effectiveness of the arrangements in a manner which permits a direct comparison with these standards.

The defining of performance standards undertakes at the following three levels:

- Policy-based
- System
- Technical

Where the present work is mainly concerned with the assessment against the standards associated with the first two levels.

The policy-based performance standard relates to this objective to provide a working environment, where the risk to the individual reduced to a level that is ALARP.

This performance standard is therefore, expressed in the form of individual risk and the arrangements for managing this risk should result in a level of 'Individual Risk', based on a proposed Tolerability Criteria, Figure (2).




Figure (2) Criteria for Individual Risk Tolerability



The criterion for IR tolerability for workers and to the public outlined in Table (2) and Figure (3).

It should be noted that these criteria proposed only as a guideline. Risk assessment is no substitute to professional judgement.

Table (2) Proposed Individual Risk (IR) Criteria (per person/year)

Risk Level	Workers	Public
<i>Intolerable</i>	$> 10^{-3}$ per person/yr.	$> 10^{-4}$ per person/yr.
<i>Negligible</i>	$> 10^{-5}$ per person/yr.	$> 10^{-6}$ per person/yr.




Figure (3) Proposed Individual Risk Criteria

Workers would include the Company employees and contractors. The public includes the public, visitors, and any third party who is not directly involved in the Company work activities.

On this basis, we have chosen to set our level of intolerability at Individual Risk for workers of 1 in 1,000 per year, and we define an individual risk of 1 in 100,000 per year as broadly acceptable. Consequently, our ALARP region is between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 100,000 per person/year.

It is important to ensure that conflict between these subordinate standards and those stemming from international codes and standards are avoided and that any subordinate standards introduced are at least on a par with or augment those standards, which are associated with compliance with these international requirements. These system level performance standards are included as part of



the summaries from the QRA. These used as the basis for assessing the suitability and sufficiency of Egypt Gas Site arrangements for both protecting personnel on site and members of public from major hazards and securing effective response in an emergency. Failure to meet acceptance criteria at this level results in the identification of remedial measures for assessment both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The analytical work uses a system analysis approach and divided into a number of distinct phases:

- Data collection, including results from site-based qualitative assessments.
- Definition of arrangements.
- Qualitative evaluation of arrangements against a catalogue of fire and explosion hazards from other major accident hazards.
- Preparing of event tree analysis models.
- Consolidation of list of design events.
- Analysis of the effect of design events on fire, explosion and toxic hazard management and emergency response arrangements.
- Quantification of that impact in terms of individual risk.

The main model would base on a systems approach, and it takes the following form:

- Estimates of incremental individual risk (IIR) per person/yr.
- Is caused-consequences based.
- Uses event tree analysis to calculate the frequency of occurrence.
- Estimates incremental individual risk utilizing event tree analysis, based on modeling the emergency response arrangements from detection through to recovery to a place of safety.



Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage

A criterion used in the QRA study for the calculation of personnel vulnerability and structural / asset damage because of fire, explosion and toxic release shown in Table (3).

The criteria shown below provide some assumptions for the impairment effects of hydrocarbon releases on personnel and structures, which based on Health and Safety Executive: Methods of approximation and determination of human vulnerability for offshore major accident hazard assessment.

Table (3) Criteria for Personnel Vulnerability and Structural Damage

Event Type	Threshold of Fatality	Asset/Structural Damage
Jet and Diffusive Fire Impingement	6.3 kW/ m ² (1)	- Flame impingement 10 minutes.
	12.5 kW/m ² (2)	- 300 - 500 kW/m ² Structural Failure within 20 minutes.
Pool Fire Impingement	6.3 kW/ m ² (1)	- Flame impingement 20 minutes
	12.5 kW/m ² (2)	- 100 - 150 kW/m ² Structural Failure within 30 minutes.
Smoke	2.3% v/v (3)	
	15% v/v (4)	
Explosion Overpressure	300 mbar	100 mbar

- (1) Fatality within 1 - 2 minutes
- (2) Fatal < 1 minute
- (3) Above 2.3%, escape possible but difficult
- (4) No escape possible, fatal in a few seconds

The effects of exposure to fire expressed in terms of heat radiation (kW/m²) and overpressure waves shown in Tables (4), (5) and (6).



Table (4) Heat Radiation Effects on Structures (International Data Bank)

Radiation Level kW/m ²	Observed Effect
37.5	Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment.
25	Minimum energy to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure (non-piloted).
12.5	Minimum energy required to ignite wood, melting of plastic tubing.

Table (5) Heat Radiation Effects on People

Radiation Level kW/m ²	Effects on People
1.2	Equivalent to heat from sun at midday summer.
1.6	Minimum level at which pain can be sensed.
4 - 6	Pain caused in 15 - 20 seconds, Second Degree burns after 30 seconds.
12	20 % chance of fatality for 60 seconds exposure.
25	100 % chance of fatality for continuous exposure. 50 % chance of fatality for 30 seconds exposure.
40	30 % chance of fatality for 15 seconds exposure.
50	100 % chance of fatality for 20 seconds exposure.

*Ref.1- OGP, International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, March 2010.

*Ref.2- API 521

**Table (6) Effects of Overpressure**

Pressure		Effects / Damage
bar	psig	
0.002	0.03	Occasional breakage of glass windows.
0.006	0.1	Breakage of some small windows.
0.021	0.3	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05. 10 % glass broken.
0.027	0.4	Minor structural damage of buildings.
0.068	1.0	Partial collapse of walls and roofs, possible injuries.
0.137	2.0	Some severe injuries, death unlikely.
0.206	3.0	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation.
0.275	4.0	Oil storage tanks ruptured.
0.344	5.0	Wooden utilities poles snapped / Fatalities.
0.41	6.0	Nearly complete destruction of building.
0.48	7.0	Loaded wagon train overturned.
0.689	10.0	Total destruction of buildings.



Quantification of the Frequency of Occurrence

The probability of a sequence of events leading to a major hazard is dependent on the probability of each event in a sequence occurring; usually these probabilities may be multiplied together to obtain the end event probability or frequency.

The technique of Quantified Risk Assessment 'QRA' requires data in the form of probability or frequency to be estimated for each input event.

Ideally, data relating to hardware failures and human error that are specific to each plant should be obtained from the company's maintenance and historical records.

Unfortunately, records available were not in the form that allows data relevant to this study to be obtained. Therefore, other sources of data were used as a basis for failure/error scenarios. The sources of information and data are shown in the References section of this report.

Identification of Scenarios Leading to Selected Failures

For each selected failure scenario, the potential contributory factors were examined, taking into account any protective features available. Typically, the factors examined included:

- Operator error
- Metallurgical fatigue or ageing of materials
- Internal or external Corrosion
- Loss of process control, e.g., pressure, temperature or flow, etc.
- Overfilling of vessels
- Introduction of impurities
- Fire and/or explosion
- Missiles
- Flooding

Account was taken at this stage of those limited releases, which, although in themselves did not constitute a significant off-site hazard could, under some circumstances, initiate a sequence leading to a larger release, as a knock-on effect.

It was noted that the proposed criterion for risk tolerability was used in Egypt by the following organizations: British Gas / British Petroleum / Shell / Total.



Relevant Weather Data for the Study

- Weather Data

The Weather Data relevant to this study consists of a list of weather conditions in the form of different combinations of wind-speed/direction, temperature, humidity and atmospheric stability. Table (7)

The weather conditions are an important input into the dispersion calculations and results for a single set of conditions could give a misleading picture of the hazard potential.

Met-oceanographic data gathered from Weather base for Dekerness Area – Dakahleyia Governorate over a period of some years.

These data included wind speed, wind direction, air temperature and humidity, as well as current speed, direction and wave height.

Table (7) Annual Average Temperature, Relative Humidity and Wind Speed / Direction

• Air Temperature °C		
	Min. Recorded	13.4 °C
	Max. Recorded	26.7 °C
	Annual Average	20.5 °C
• Relative Humidity %		
	Average Daily Min.	60.7 %
	Average Daily Max.	70.4 %
	Annual Average	66.8 %
• Wind Speed m/s		
	Annual Average	3.4 m / sec.
• Wind Direction		
	Annual Average	NNW / NW / N

The general climatic conditions at Dakahleyia Governorate (Dekerness Area) are summarized in Tables No. (8, 9 & 10) Below.



Table (8) Mean of Monthly Air Temperature (°C) - Dekerness Area

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Temp. (c°)	13.4	14.1	15.9	19.3	22.4	25.5	26.5	26.7	25.3	22.9	19.1	15.2

Table (9) Mean of Monthly Wind Speed (m/sec) - Dekerness Area

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Wind Speed (m/sec)	3.30	3.69	4.11	3.88	3.80	3.61	3.31	3	3	3.19	3	3.11

Table (10) Mean of Monthly Average Relative Humidity - Dekerness Area

Months	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Relative Humidity (%)	70	68.1	65.9	61.5	60.7	62.1	67.2	69.4	68.4	67.9	70.2	70.4

Figure (4) shows the maximum temperature diagram for Dakahleyia Governorate (Dekerness Area)




Figure (4) – Monthly Variations of the Maximum Temperature for Dekerness Area



Figures (5 & 6) show the monthly variations of the wind speed as well as wind rose for Dakahleyia Governorate (Dekerness Area) respectively.




Figure (5) – Monthly Variations of the Wind Speed for Dekerness Area




Figure (6) – Wind Rose for Dekerness Area



Figure (7) shows the monthly variations of the sunny, cloudy and precipitation days for Dakahleyia Governorate (Dekerness Area).




Figure (7) – Monthly Variations of the Sunny, Cloudy and Precipitation days for Dekerness Area



- Stability Categories

The two most significant variables, which would affect the dispersion calculations, are Wind-speed and atmospheric stability. The stability class is a measure of the atmospheric turbulence caused by thermal gradients. Pasqual Stability identifies six main categories, which shown in the Tables (11 & 12) and summarized in Table (13).

Table (11) Pasqual Stability Categories

A	B	C	D	E	F
Very Unstable	Unstable	Moderately Unstable	Neutral	Moderately Stable	Stable

Neutral conditions correspond to a vertical temperature gradient of about 1o C per 100 m.

Table (12) Relationship between Wind Speed and Stability

Wind speed (m/s)	Day-time Solar Radiation			Night-time Cloud Cover		
	Strong	Medium	Slight	Thin <3/8	Medium >3/8	Overcast >4/5
<2	A	A-B	B	-	-	D
2-3	A-B	B	C	E	F	D
3-5	B	B-C	C	D	E	D
5-6	C	C-D	D	D	D	D
>6	C	D	D	D	D	D

Table (13) Sets of Weather Conditions Initially Selected for this Study

Set for Wind Speed and Stability	
Wind speed	Stability
3.4 m/sec.	D



Dekerness PRMS Description

Background

Dekerness Pressure Reduction and Metering Station Operated by Egypt Gas Company. It is located about 6.5 km North West direction from Dekerness City downtown, and about 22 km from Mansoura City. The PRMS will provide the natural gas to Dekerness and surrounding area public housing. The PRMS feeding will be from the National Gas Pipeline owned by GASCO and the off-take point will be located inside the PRMS boundary. The off-take point pressure will be from 20 to 70 bar, and then the pressure reduced to 7 bar at the PRMS facilities with adding odorant, and then connected to the internal distribution network to public housing at Dekerness and surrounding area.

PRMS & Off-Take Location Coordinates (Egypt Gas Data)

Point	PRMS	
	North (N)	East (E)
1	<i>31° 06 04.95"</i>	<i>31° 38' 31.95"</i>
2	<i>31° 06 01.99"</i>	<i>31° 38' 29.50"</i>
3	<i>31° 06 02.01"</i>	<i>31° 38' 28.70"</i>
4	<i>31° 06 29.49"</i>	<i>31° 38' 29.55"</i>

PRMS Brief Description and Components (Egypt Gas Data)

The PRMS will be surround by 3 m height fence and mainly consist of the followings: (Ref. Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11)

- 0 Inlet module: which contains 4" # 600 manual isolation valve.
- 0 Filter module: two identical streams each contain inlet and outlet isolation valves.
- 0 Heating system module: two identical.
- 0 Metering module: two identical.
- 0 Regulating module: two identical regulating lines.
- 0 Outlet module: it contains manual outlet isolation valve.
- 0 Odorant module: 600 lit. capacity bulk tank / 50 lit. daily use.
- 0 Off-take will be an underground room including the isolation valves connected with GASCO underground pipeline with a diameter of 24".
- 0 Security Office (one floor)
- 0 Administration office (one floor)
- 0 Firefighting Facilities (Fire Water Tank / Pumps / Fire water Network)



Dekerness PRMS Units (Egypt Gas Data)

Table (14) Dekerness PRMS Units

No	PRMS Units	Capacity	Size
1	<i>Inlet unit</i>		
	Inlet valve	20000 scmh	6"
	Inlet valve bypass (ball + plug)		2"
2	<i>Filter units</i>		
	Line F1	10000 scmh	4" x 3"
	Line F2	10000 scmh	4" x 3"
	Line F3 (valves only)	10000 scmh	4" x 3"
	Line F3 (only blind flange)	20000 scmh	6" x 4"
	Line F4 (only blind flange)	20000 scmh	6" x 4"
3	<i>Meter unit</i>		
	Line M1	10000 scmh	3" x 4" x 3"
	Line M2	10000 scmh	3" x 4" x 3"
	Line M3 (valves only)	10000 scmh	3" x 3"
	Line M3 (only blind flange)	20000 scmh	4" x 4"
	Line M4 (only blind flange)	20000 scmh	4" x 4"
	One extension ball valve on outlet header (future heater)		
One ball valve full bore for heater bypass			
4	<i>Regulator unit</i>		
	Line R1	10000 scmh	3" x 6"
	Line R2	10000 scmh	3" x 6"
	Line R3(valves only)	10000 scmh	3" x 6"
	Line R3(only blind flange)	20000 scmh	4" x 6"
	Line R4(only blind flange)	20000 scmh	4" x 6"
	One extension ball valve on inlet header (future heater)		

Prepared By:

PETROSAFE



Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company "EGAS"

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No	PRMS Units	Capacity	Size
5	<i>Odorant unit</i>		
	Electrical pumps		
	Lapping system		
6	<i>Outlet unit</i>		
	Outlet valve	20000 scmh	8"
	Extension valve (future)		
7	<i>Monitoring and Control unit</i>		
8	<i>Generator (15 KVA)</i>		
9	<i>UPS</i>		




Figure (8) Dekerness Pressure Reduction and Metering Station "PRMS" and Off-Take Point General Layout (Egypt Gas Data)




Figure (9) Dekerness PRMS Piping and Instrumentation Diagram "P&ID" for Inlet & Filter Separator Section (Egpt Gas Data)




Figure (10) Dekerness Pressure Reduction and Metering Station "PRMS" Isometric Top View (Egypt Gas Data)




Figure (11) Dekerness Pressure Reduction and Metering Station "PRMS" Isometric 3D View (Egypt Gas Data)



Figure (12) Dekerness PRMS / Offtake and Surroundings Plotted on Google Earth Photo



Figure (13) Dekerness PRMS / Offtake Distances to the Nearest Surroundings Plotted on Google Earth Photo



Process Condition Data (Egypt Gas Company Data)

The following table no (15) describes the process conditions for Dekerness PRMS:

Table (15) Process Conditions / Gas Components & Specifications

Process Conditions	
Maximum flow rate scm / hr	10000
future flow rate scm / hr	
Design pressure bar g	70
Min / Max inlet pressure bar g	20 – 70
Min / Max outlet pressure bar g	7
Min / Max inlet temperature °C	15 – 25
Outlet temperature °C	Not less than 1

Gas Components	
Gas composition % Mol	
Water	0
H ₂ S	4 ppm
Nitrogen	0.2 - 0.83
Carbon Dioxide	0.07 - 3
Methane	77.73 - 99.82
Ethane	0.03 - 15.68
Propane	0.01 - 4.39
I-Butane	0.0 - 1.14
N-Butane	0.0 - 1.01
I-Pentane	0.0 - 0.19
N-Butane	0.0 - 0.26
C6+	0.0 - 0.25

Gas Specifications	
Specific gravity	0.5 - 0.69 (air = 1 k/m ³)



Gas Odorant Specifications

The odorant supplied with a Hazard Data Sheet and identified as Spotleak 1009. Spotleak is an aliphatic mixture in clear liquid form that is extremely flammable, with the following characteristics:

0 Boiling Range	60-70° C
0 Flash Point	-17.8° C
0 Freezing Point	-45.5° C
0 Density (H ₂ O = 1)	0.812 @ 15.5° C
0 Vapor Density	3.0 (air = 1)
0 Vapor Pressure (mm Hg)	6.6 @ 37.8° C

Health Hazards

Spotleak is not carcinogenic, but the major health hazards as a result of exposure to Spotleak include the following:

Inhalation

- Short-term exposure: Irritation and central nervous system effects
- Long-term exposure: Irritation

Skin Contact

- Short-term: Irritation
- Long-term: Dermatitis

Eye Contact

- Short-term: Irritation and tearing
- Long-term: Irritation

Ingestion

- Short-term: nausea, vomiting, central nervous system effects
- Long-term: no effects are known

Hygiene Standards and Limits

PEL: 10 PPM according to OSHA, TWA (NIOSH): 0.5 ppm not to be exceeded during any 15 minute work period. "Refer to Annex 5 of PRS ESIA"

Fire and Explosion Hazards

Spotleak is a severe fire hazard. Vapor/air mixtures are explosive. Vapor is 3 times heavier than air. Vapor may ignite at distant ignition sources and flash back.

Thermal decomposition products include oxides of sulphur and hydrogen sulphide.



Fire Fighting and Protection Systems and Facilities

As per minutes of the coordination meeting dated 20/07/2016 with Civil Protection, the PRMS will be provided by the following fire protection facilities:

- Firewater tank with a capacity of 40 cum.
- Firewater pumps (1 electrical & 1 diesel with capacity of 250 gpm each).
- Firewater main with a diameter of 4 inch.
- Firewater hydrants 1.5 inch X 1 / each.
- Firewater monitors.
- Smoke detector in all admin rooms & FM200 firefighting system for the control room.
- Heat detectors in buffet rooms.
- Smoke detectors in control rooms according to the area.
- Different sizes of fire extinguishers will be distributed at PRMS site.

Emergency Response Plan "ERP"

The Emergency Response Plan "ERP" for Dekerness PRS is not provided by Egypt Gas, so it must be prepared (if not) to include all related items including all scenarios that have been identified by this QRA study.



Analytical Results of Consequence Modeling

1.0- Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (6 inch)

1/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (16) Show that:

Table (16) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 1" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	2.1	1.1	0.5 @ 1.6 m
	LFL	6.5	1.3	0.6 @ 4 m
	50 % LFL	12.8	1.6	1.2 @ 8 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	12	1.6	19	13	0
		4	16	8	0
		9.5	14	5	0
		12.5	13	2	20% /60 sec.
		25	12	1.9	80.34
		37.5	9.5	0.5	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	13	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	3.5	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	2.5	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation



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


Figure (14) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)





Figure (15) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)



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



Figure (16) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)



1/2- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (17) Show that:

Table (17) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 3" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	8.5	1.4	0.8 @ 5 m
	LFL	31.5	0 - 2.4	2.4 @ 20 m
	50 % LFL	36	0 - 3.4	3.4 @ 30 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	42	1.6	86	70	0
		4	70	45	0
		9.5	57	30	0
		12.5	55	25	20% /60 sec.
		25	47	17	80.34
		37.5	45	12	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	60	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	15	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	5	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



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



Figure (17) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (3" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)



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



Figure (18) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (3" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)





Figure (19) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (3" hole in 6" Inlet Pipeline)



1/3- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rupture) Gas Release

The following table no. (18) Show that:

Table (18) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 6" Gas Release

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.4 D	UFL	13.5	1.6	1.2 @ 8 m	
	LFL	26.5	0 – 3.1	3.1 @ 21 m	
	50 % LFL	29.5	0 – 3.9	3.9 @ 22 m	
Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	80	1.6	200	160	0
		4	160	105	0
		9.5	130	70	0
		12.5	120	60	20 %/60 sec.
		25	100	40	80.34
		37.5	90	30	98.74
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage		
3.4 D	0.020	70	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>	
	0.137	15	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>	
	0.206	5	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>	




Figure (20) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)





Figure (21) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)



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



Figure (22) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture)



2.0- Pressure Reduction Station Outlet Pipeline (8 inch)

2/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (19) Shows that:

Table (19) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 1" / 8" Gas Release

Gas Release (Outlet / PRV "Low Pressure")				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	1.1	1.03	0.1 @ 1 m
	LFL	3.5	1.15	0.40 @ 2 m
	50 % LFL	6.2	1.3	0.65 @ 4 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	6.5	1.6	9	5	0
		4	7.5	2.6	0
		9.5	6.3	1	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	N/D	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	N/D	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	N/D	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



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


Figure (23) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)





Figure (24) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)



2/2- Consequence Modeling for 4 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (20) Show that:

Table (20) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 4" / 8" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	3.8	1.5	0.3 @ 2 m
	LFL	11.1	1.55	1.55 @ 7 m
	50 % LFL	13.8	0 – 2.05	2.05 @ 10.40 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	30	1.6	58	46	0
		4	46	30	0
		9.5	40	20	0
		12.5	38	16	20% /60 sec.
		25	32	10	80.34
		37.5	30	8	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	22	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	6	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	4	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation





Figure (25) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (4" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)



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



Figure (26) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (4" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)



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



Figure (27) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (4" hole in 8" Outlet Pipeline)



2/3- Consequence Modeling for 8 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (21) Show that:

Table (21) Dispersion Modeling for Outlet - 8" Gas Release

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
3.4 D	UFL	4.6	1.2	0.4 @ 2.5 m	
	LFL	8.5	1.65	1.4 @ 6.5 m	
	50 % LFL	9.5	1.9	1.9 @ 7 m	

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	60	1.6	130	105	0
		4	100	70	0
		9.5	85	45	0
		12.5	80	40	20% /60 sec.
		25	70	25	80.34
		37.5	62	20	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	30	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	8	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	6	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation

Fireball			
Wind Category	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²) Effects on People & Structures
3.4 D	4	28	<u>12.5</u> 20 % Chance of fatality for 60 sec exposure
	12.5	16	<u>25</u> 100 % Chance of fatality for continuous exposure 50 % Chance of fatality for 30 sec exposure
	37.5	8.5	<u>37.5</u> Sufficient of cause process equipment damage



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


Figure (28) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)



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



Figure (29) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)



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



Figure (30) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)





Figure (31) Heat Radiation Contours from Fireball (8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture)



3.0- Pressure Reduction Station Odorant Tank (Spotleak)

The following table no. (22) Show 1" hole leak form odorant Modeling:

Table (22) Dispersion Modeling for Odorant Tank

Gas Release				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	17.5	0 – 0.2	14
	LFL	52	0 – 0.7	19
	50 % LFL	74	0 – 1.1	26

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	8	1.6	20	26	0
		4	14	16	0
		9.5	12	11	0
		12.5	11	9	20% /60 sec.
		25	9	6	80.34
		37.5	8	4	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	65	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	17	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	15	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station





Figure (32) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Side View Graph (Odorant leak)



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



Figure (33) Heat Radiation Contours - Jet Fire on Site (Odorant Leak)



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



Figure (34) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves Graph (Odorant Leak)



4.0- Gas Heater (Water Bath Heating System)

The following table no. (23) Show 1" hole leak from the heater Modeling:

Table (23) Dispersion Modeling for Heater Tank

Gas Release				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	2	1.1	0.30 @ 1.5 m
	LFL	6	1.3	0.70 @ 4 m
	50 % LFL	11.6	0 – 1.55	1.1 @ 7.5 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	11.5	1.6	17.5	12	0
		4	15	7	0
		9.5	13	4	0
		12.5	12	3	20% /60 sec.
		25	11	1.5	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	12	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	3	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	2.7	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station




Figure (35) Vapor Cloud (UFL/LFL) Side View Graph (Gas Heater)



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station





Figure (36) Heat Radiation Contours – Jet Fire on Site (Gas Heater)



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



Figure (37) Late Explosion Overpressure Waves on Site (Gas Heater)



5.0- Pressure Reduction Station Off-Take Pipeline (6 inch)

5/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (24) Show that:

Table (24) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 1" / 3" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	1.16	7.2	1.5
	LFL	0.45	4.7	0.6
	50 % LFL	0.06	1.8	0.2

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	3	1.6	18	17	0
		4	11	9	0
		9.5	3.5	2	0
		12.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	N/D	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	N/D	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	N/D	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station




Figure (38) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (1" hole in 3" off-take Pipeline)



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station





Figure (39) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (1" hole in 3" off-take Pipeline)



5/2- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (25) Show that:

Table (25) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 3" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	0.15	2.8	0.3
	LFL	1.25	8	1.6
	50 % LFL	2.85	11.3	3.4

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	10	1.6	65	65	0
		4	40	35	0
		9.5	16	15	0.72
		12.5	10	7	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not Reached	Not Reached	80.34
		37.5	Not Reached	Not Reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)			
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage
3.4 D	0.020	N/D	0.021 bar <i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	N/D	0.137 bar <i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	N/D	0.206 bar <i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>




Figure (40) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (3" hole in 6" off-take Pipeline)





Figure (41) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (3" hole in 6" off-take Pipeline)



5/3- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (26) Shows that:

Table (26) Dispersion Modeling for Off-take - 6" Gas Release

Gas Release				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
3.4 D	UFL	0.6	11	1
	LFL	3	23	4.2
	50 % LFL	4.7	24	6.7

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
3.4 D	20	1.6	150	140	0
		4	90	80	0
		9.5	40	38	0
		12.5	30	25	20% /60 sec.
		25	Not reached	Not reached	80.34
		37.5	Not reached	Not reached	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Over Pressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
3.4 D	0.020	N/D	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	N/D	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	N/D	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



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Figure (42) Gas Cloud Side View (UFL/LFL) (6" off-take Pipeline Full Rupture)





Figure (43) Heat Radiation Contours from Jet Fire (6" off-take Pipeline Full Rupture)



Individual Risk Evaluation

• Risk Calculation

All identified hazards should be subject to an evaluation for risk potential. This means analyzing the hazard for its probability to actually progress to loss event, as well as likely consequences of this event.

There are four steps to calculate risk, which determined as follows:

- 1- *Identify failure frequency (International Data Base)*
- 2- *Calculating the frequency against control measures at site by using Event Tree Analysis "ETA".*
- 3- *Identify scenarios probability.*
- 4- *Calculated risk to people regarding to the vulnerability of life loses.*

Basically, risk will be calculated as presented in the following equation:

Risk to people (Individual Risk – IR) =

Total Risk (Σ Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability

Where:

- Total risk *Is the sum of contributions from all hazards exposed to (fire / explosion).*
- Occupancy *Is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards. (Expected that x man the most exposed person to fire/explosion hazards on site. He works 8 hours shift/day)*
- Vulnerability *Is the probability that exposure to the hazard will result in fatality.*

As shown in tables (5 & 6) – (Page: 33 & 34) *the vulnerability of people to heat radiation starting from 12.5 kW/m² will lead to fatality accident for 60 sec. Exposure and for explosion over pressure starting from 0.137 bar.*



The modeling of the different scenarios shows that the heat radiation and explosion overpressure waves would be a result from release scenarios for all sizes of crack and according to the space size for the PRMS, all of the sequence will be determined for three values release (small, medium and large).

Calculating frequencies needs a very comprehensive calculation which needs a lot of data collecting related to failure of equipment's and accident reporting with detailed investigation to know the failure frequency rates in order to calculate risks from scenarios.

In this study, it is decided to use an International Data Bank for major hazardous incident data.

The following table (27) shows the frequency for each failure that can be raised in pressure reduction station operations:



Table (27) Failure Frequency for Each Scenario

Scenario	Release Size	Failure Cause	Failure Rate
Gas Release from 1"/6"- 8" Pipeline / 3" Gas Heater	<i>Small</i>	Internal Corrosion	1.19E-05
		External Corrosion	3.55E-06
		Maintenance Error	2.28E-05
		Corrosive Liquid or Gas	4.84E-04
		Total	5.22E-04
Gas Release from 3"/6"&4"/8" Pipeline	<i>Medium</i>	Internal Corrosion	2.71E-05
		External Corrosion	8.24E-06
		Erosion	4.85E-04
		Total	5.20E-04
Gas Release from 6" / 8" Pipeline Full Rupture	<i>Large</i>	Internal Corrosion	5.53E-06
		External Corrosion	1.61E-06
		Weld Crack	4.34E-06
		Earthquake	1.33E-07
		Total	1.16E-05
Spotleak (Odorant Tank)	<i>Medium</i>	<i>As a package</i>	Failure Rate
Reference: Taylor Associates ApS - 2006 (Hazardous Materials Release and Accident Frequencies for Process Plant - Volume II / Process Unit Release Frequencies - Version 1 Issue 7)			1.25E-05



- **Event Tree Analysis**

An event tree is a graphical way of showing the possible outcomes of a hazardous event, such as a failure of equipment or human error.

An ETA involves determining the responses of systems and operators to the hazardous event in order to determine all possible alternative outcomes.

The result of the ETA is a series of scenarios arising from different sets of failures or errors.

These scenarios describe the possible accident outcomes in terms of the sequence of events (successes or failures of safety functions) that follow the initial hazardous event.

Event trees shall be used to identify the various escalation paths that can occur in the process. After these escalation paths are identified, the specific combinations of failures that can lead to defined outcomes can then be determined.

This allows identification of additional barriers to reduce the likelihood of such escalation.

The results of an ETA are the event tree models and the safety system successes or failures that lead to each defined outcome.

Accident sequences represents in an event tree represent logical and combinations of events; thus, these sequences can be put into the form of a fault tree model for further qualitative analysis.

These results may be used to identify design and procedural weaknesses, and normally to provide recommendations for reducing the likelihood and/or consequences of the analyzed potential accidents.

Using ETA requires knowledge of potential initiating events (that is, equipment failures or system upsets that can potentially cause an accident), and knowledge of safety system functions or emergency procedures that potentially mitigate the effects of each initiating event.

The equipment failures, system upsets and safety system functions shall be extracted from the likelihood data presented before.



In the case of hydrocarbon release, the event tree first branch is typically representing "Early Ignition". These events are represented in the risk analysis as jet fire events.

This is because sufficient time is unlikely to elapse before ignition for a gas/air mixture to accumulate and cause either a flash fire or a gas hazard.

Subsequent branches for these events represent gas detection, fire detection, inventory isolation (or ESD) or deluge activation.

Delayed ignitions are typically represented by the fifth branch event. This is because, in the time taken for an ignition to occur, sufficient time is more likely to elapse for gas detection and inventory isolation.

The scenario development shall be performed for the following cases:

- Without any control measures
- With control measures

The event tree analysis outcomes can be classified into three main categories as follows:

"Limited Consequence"	<i>Indicates that the release has been detected and the inventory source has been isolated automatically.</i>
"Controlled Consequence"	<i>Indicates that the release has been detected but the source has not been isolated automatically. [Needs human intervention].</i>
"Escalated Consequence"	<i>Indicates that the release has not been detected and consequently the source has not been isolated.</i>

The event trees analysis for each scenario are presented in the below pages:



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station

Table (28) Inlet 6" / Outlet 8" / Off-Take 6" / Waterbath 3" Pipeline Scenarios (Pin Hole Crack – 1" Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials ⁽¹⁾	Immediate Ignition ⁽²⁾	Fire Detection ⁽³⁾	ESD System ⁽³⁾	Fire Protec. ⁽³⁾	Delayed Ignition ⁽²⁾	Outcomes	Frequency
5.22E-04	0.02	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.02		
5.22E-04	Yes 0.02 No 0.98	Yes 0.6 No 0.4	Yes 0.978 No 0.022	Yes 0.97		Controlled Jet fire	1.01E-05
				No 0.03		Not controlled jet fire	3.13E-07
		Yes 0.97		Escalated jet fire	4.18E-06		
		No 0.03		Limited release	-----		
		Yes 0.97		Large release	1.13E-05		
		No 0.03		Escalated jet fire	1.02E-05		
		Yes 0.97		Escalated release	5.01E-04		
TOTAL							1.47E-05

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.



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Table (29) Inlet 6" / Off-Take 6" Pipeline Scenarios (Half Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials ⁽¹⁾	Immediate Ignition ⁽²⁾	Fire Detection ⁽³⁾	ESD System ⁽³⁾	Fire Protec. ⁽³⁾	Delayed Ignition ⁽²⁾	Outcomes	Frequency
5.20E-04	0.04	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.04		
		Yes 0.6		Yes 0.97		Controlled Jet fire	2.02E-05
		No 0.4		No 0.03		Not controlled jet fire	6.24E-07
	Yes 0.04					Escalated jet fire	8.32E-06
5.20E-04			Yes 0.978			Limited release	-----
			No 0.022			Large release	1.10E-05
	No 0.96				Yes 0.04	Escalated jet fire	2.00E-05
					No 0.96	Escalated release	4.79E-04
(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)							
(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.							
(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.							
TOTAL							2.89E-05



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Table (30) Outlet 8" Pipeline Scenario (Half Rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials ⁽¹⁾	Immediate Ignition ⁽²⁾	Fire Detection ⁽³⁾	ESD System ⁽³⁾	Fire Protec. ⁽³⁾	Delayed Ignition ⁽²⁾	Outcomes	Frequency	
5.20E-04	0.02	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.02			
5.20E-04	Yes 0.02	Yes 0.6	Yes 0.978	Yes 0.97	No 0.03	Controlled Jet fire	1.01E-05	
						Not controlled jet fire	3.12E-07	
	No 0.98	No 0.4	No 0.022	Yes 0.02	No 0.98	Escalated jet fire	4.16E-06	
						Limited release	-----	
							Large release	1.12E-05
							Escalated jet fire	1.02E-05
							Escalated release	4.99E-04
TOTAL							1.47E-05	

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station

Table (31) Inlet 6" / Off-Take 6" / Outlet 8" Pipeline Scenarios (Full rupture Release) – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials ⁽¹⁾	Immediate Ignition ⁽²⁾	Fire Detection ⁽³⁾	ESD System ⁽³⁾	Fire Protec. ⁽³⁾	Delayed Ignition ⁽²⁾	Outcomes	Frequency	
1.16E-05	0.04	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.04			
1.16E-05	Yes 0.04	Yes 0.6	Yes 0.978	Yes 0.97	No 0.03	Controlled Jet fire	4.50E-07	
						Not controlled jet fire	1.39E-08	
	No 0.96	No 0.4	No 0.022	Yes 0.04	No 0.96	Escalated jet fire	1.86E-07	
						Limited release	-----	
							Large release	2.45E-07
							Escalated jet fire	4.45E-07
							Escalated release	1.07E-05
						TOTAL	6.45E-07	

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.



Document Title: Quantitative Risk Assessment "QRA" Study for Dekerness Pressure Reduction & Metering Station

Table (32) Odorant Tank Release – Event Tree Analysis

Release of Flammable Materials ⁽¹⁾	Immediate Ignition ⁽²⁾	Fire Detection ⁽³⁾	ESD System System ⁽³⁾	Fire Protec. ⁽³⁾	Delayed Ignition ⁽²⁾	Outcomes	Frequency
1.25E-05	0.065	0.6	0.978	0.97	0.07		
1.25E-05	Yes 0.065	Yes 0.6	Yes 0.978	Yes 0.97	Yes 0.07	Controlled Jet fire	7.88E-07
				No 0.03		Large fire	2.44E-08
		No 0.4	No 0.022	No 0.93	No 0.93	Escalated jet fire	3.25E-07
						Limited leak	-----
		No 0.935	No 0.022	No 0.93	No 0.93	Large leak	2.57E-07
						Escalated jet fire	8.18E-07
						Escalated leak	1.09E-05
TOTAL							1.23E-05

(1) Refer to QRA Study Page 94. (Taylor Associates ApS - 2006)

(2) Ref. Handbook Failure Frequencies 2009.

(3) Ref. OGP – Report No. 434 – A1 / 2010.



The following table (32) shows the total frequency for each scenario from ETA - Tables (28 to 32):

Table (33) Total Frequencies for Each Scenario

Source of Release	Total Frequency (ETA)
1" / 6" Inlet Pipeline Pin Hole	1.47E-05
1" / 6" Off-Take Pipeline Pin Hole	
1" / 8" Outlet Pipeline Pin Hole	
1" / 3" Gas Heater Pin Hole	
3" / 6" Inlet Pipeline Half Rupture	2.89E-05
3" / 6" Off-Take Pipeline Half Rupture	
4" / 8" Outlet Pipeline Half Rupture	1.47E-05
6" Inlet Pipeline Full Rupture	6.45E-07
6" Off-Take Pipeline Full Rupture	
8" Outlet Pipeline Full Rupture	
Odorant Tank 1" hole Leak	1.23E-05

The following table (33) summarize the risk events on workers / public, and as there is no direct effects on public from any scenario it will be assumed that one person (as public) works as farmer for 1 hour / day light, and one operator (as worker) for operation / maintenance inside the PRS boundary for 2 hours / day light.

Table No. (34) Summarize the Risk on Workers / Public (Occupancy)

Inlet 4" Pipeline Release Scenarios					
Event	Exposure	Jet / Pool Fire (12.5 kW/m ²)		Explosion Overpressure (0.137 bar)	
		Workers	Public	Workers	Public
Pin Hole	1"	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None
Half Rupture	3"	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)
Full Rupture	6"	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)
Outlet 6" Pipeline Release Scenarios					
Pin Hole	1"	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None	None	None
Half Rupture	4"	1 for 2 h (0.08)	1 for 1 h (0.04)	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)
Full Rupture	8"	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)
Odorant Tank Release Scenario					
Small Leak	1"	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None	None	1 for 1 h (0.04)
Gas heater (water bath heating system)					
Small Leak	1"	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None
Off-Take 4" Pipeline Release Scenarios					
Pin Hole	1"	None	None	None	None
Half Rupture	3"	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None	None	None
Full Rupture	6"	1 for 2 h (0.08)	None	None	None



Therefore, the risk calculation will depend on total risk from these scenarios, and as per the equation page (98):

Risk to People (Individual Risk – IR) =

Total Risk (Σ Frequency of fire/explosion) x Occupancy x Vulnerability

Where:

- Total risk - is the sum of contributions from all hazards exposed to (fire / explosion).

(Frequencies of Scenarios from Table-32)

- Occupancy - is the proportion of time exposed to work hazards. (Expected that X man the most exposed person to fire/explosion hazards on site. He works 8 hours "shift/day").

(as per Egypt Gas data, Dekerness PRMS occupied by 3 persons for 24 hours, and as there is no direct effects on public from any of the scenarios it will be assumed that one person "as public around the PRMS" works as farmer for 1 hour / day light, and one operator (as worker) for operation / maintenance inside the PRS boundary for 2 hours / day light. "Ref. to Table 33")

- Vulnerability - is the probability that exposure to the hazard will result in fatality.

(Reference: Report No./DNV Reg. No.: 2013-4091/1/17 TLT 29-6 – Rev. 1)

As per modeling, the IR will be calculated for the workers and the public around the PRMS (farmers around the PRS) as per the following tables (34 & 35):



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Table (35) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Workers Near to the PRMS


Source of Event	Frequency 1	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²) & Overpressure (Bar)	Vulnerability 2	Time Exposed 3	IR = 1 x 2 x 3
Gas Release from 1 1/2"- 8" Pipeline / 3" Gas Heater	1.47E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.08 ^{1 Pers.}	8.23E-07
		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Outdoor)	0.08 ^{1 Pers.}	3.53E-07
Gas Release from 3 1/2" Pipeline	2.89E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.08 ^{1 Pers.}	1.62E-06
Gas Release from 4 1/8" Pipeline	1.47E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.08 ^{1 Pers.}	8.23E-07
Gas Release from 8" Pipeline Full Rupture	6.45E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.08 ^{1 Pers.}	3.61E-08
Odorant tank 1" leak	1.23E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.08 ^{1 Pers.}	6.89E-07
TOTAL Risk for the Workers					4.34E-06



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Table (36) Individual Risk (IR) Calculation for the Public Near to the PRMS

Source of Event	Frequency 1	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²) & Overpressure (Bar)	Vulnerability 2	Time Exposed 3	IR = 1 x 2 x 3
Gas Release from 3"/6" inlet pipeline	2.89E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.04 ^{1 Pers.}	8.10E-07
		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Outdoor)		3.47E-07
Gas Release from 4"/8" outlet pipeline	1.47E-05	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.04 ^{1 Pers.}	4.12E-07
		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Outdoor)		1.76E-07
Gas Release from 6" inlet pipeline	6.45E-07	Jet Fire 12.5	0.7 (Outdoor)	0.04 ^{1 Pers.}	1.81E-08
Gas Release from 8" outlet pipeline		Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Outdoor)		7.74E-09
Odorant tank 1" leak	1.23E-05	Explosion 0.137	0.3 (Outdoor)	0.04 ^{1 Pers.}	1.48E-07
TOTAL Risk for the Public (PRMS)					1.92E-06





Summary of Modeling Results and Conclusion

As per results from modeling the consequences of each scenario, the following table summarize the study, and as follows:

Event	Scenario	Effects
Pin hole (1") gas release 6" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will be limited inside the PES boundary with no effects</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the overpressure waves will be limited inside the PRS boundary and some extension (0.02 bar) outside from south side with no effect.</i>
Half Rupture (3") gas release 6" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the southern fence and extend outside. The UFL will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation effects will extend outside the PRS southern fence downwind with no effects.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
Full Rupture gas release 6" inlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud (LFL & 50 % LFL) will extend to reach the southern fence and extend outside. The UFL will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>



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Event	Scenario	Effects
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation effects will extend outside the PRS southern fence downwind with no effects.</i>
	Explosion overpressure 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
Pin hole (1") gas release 8" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will be limited inside the PEMS boundary with no effects</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>N/D</i>
Half Rupture (4") gas release 8" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the PRMS boundary south east side with no effects downwind.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRMS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
Full Rupture gas release 8" outlet pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRMS boundary.</i>



Event	Scenario	Effects
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values will extend outside the PRMS boundary south east side with no effects downwind.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the heat overpressure waves will extend outside the PRS boundary south east side with no effects.</i>
	Heat radiation / Fireball 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 4, 12.5 & 37.5 kW/m² will limited inside the PRS boundary affecting the PRS facilities with some extension of (4 kW/m²) downwind outside from south east side.</i>
Odorant tank 1" leak		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the vapor cloud will extend outside the PRS fence from the north east side with no effects downwind. Consideration should be taken when deal with liquid, vapors and smokes according to the MSDS for the material.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that heat radiation values will be limited inside the PRMS boundary down and crosswind.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will be near to the control room, reaching firefighting facilities and extend outside the PRS boundary with no effects. The values of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will be extended outside the PRS boundary with no effect down or crosswind.</i>
Gas heater (water bath heating system)		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that all values of heat radiation will be limited inside the PRS boundary down and crosswind.</i>



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Event	Scenario	Effects
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	<i>The modeling shows that the value of 0.020 bar will extend outside the PRS fence from the east side with no effects. The value of 0.137 & 0.206 bar will be limited inside the PRS boundary with no effects inside.</i>
Pin hole (1") gas release 6" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the offtake boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation value of 1.6 & 4 kW/m² will extend outside PRS from north side with no effects. The value of 9.5 kW/m² will be limited inside the PRS boundary.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
Half Rupture (3") gas release 6" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud effects will be limited inside the Offtake boundary.</i>
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 1.6 & 4 kW/m² will reach and covers the security office and extend outside boundary from north and west side to reach the road. The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m² will be inside the boundary and extend from north side with no effects.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D
Full Rupture gas release 6" off-take pipeline		
	Gas cloud UFL LFL 50 % LFL	<i>The modeling shows that the gas cloud will be limited inside the Offtake boundary with some extension outside from south side downwind.</i>



Event	Scenario	Effects
	Heat radiation / Jet fire 9.5 kW/m ² 12.5 kW/m ²	<i>The modeling shows that the heat radiation values of 1.6 & 4 kW/m² will reach and covers security office, control room and extend outside boundary from west side to reach the road. The values of 9.5 & 12.5 kW/m² will be inside the boundary and extend from north side with no effects.</i>
	Worst case explosion 0.020 bar 0.137 bar 0.206 bar	N/D

The previous table shows that there are some of potential hazards with heat radiation (12.5 kW/m²) resulting from jet fire and explosion overpressure waves (0.137 bar) from late explosion events.

These risks (Jet fire, Fireball & overpressure waves) will affect the workers at the PRS, and reach the surrounding near to the station.

The major hazards that extend over site boundary and/or effect on workers / public were used for Risk Calculations.



Recommendations

Regarding to the modeling scenarios and risk calculations to workers / public which found in **Acceptable region (workers and public)**, therefore there are some points need to be considered to maintain the risk tolerability in its region and this will be describe in the following recommendations:

Recommendation	Timeline Phases	Egypt Gas Remarks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All PRMS facilities specifications referred to the national and international codes and standards. - Inspection and maintenance plans and programs are according to the manufacturers guidelines to keep all facility parts in a good condition. - All operations are according to standard operating procedures for the PRMS operations and training programs in-place for operators. - Emergency shutdown detailed procedure including emergency gas isolation points at the PRMS and Off-Take Point in place. - Surface drainage system is suitable for containment any odorant spillage. • Considering that all electrical equipment, facilities and connections are according to the hazardous area classification for natural gas facilities. • Preparing an emergency response plan and for the PRMS including all scenarios in this study and other needs like: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Firefighting brigades, mutual aids, emergency communications and fire detection / protection systems. - Dealing with the external road in case of major fires. 	 Design Operation Operation Operation Design Design Operation Operation Operation	

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Recommendation	Timeline Phases	Egypt Gas Remarks
- First aid including dealing with the odorant according to the MSDS for it, with respect of means of water supply for emergency showers, eye washers and cleaning.	Operation	
- Safe exits in building according to the modeling in this study, and to the PRMS from other side beside the designed exit in layout provided.	Design	
• Provide the site with SCBA "Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (at least two sets) and arrange training programs for operators.	Operation	
• Cooperation should be done with the concerned parties before planning for housing projects around the PRMS area.	Operation / Design / Construction	
• Raising and pavement of the sub-route leading to the PRMS to a suitable level to protect the PRMS area against floodings.	Construction	

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Annex "1"

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Annex "1"

Results of Consequence Modelling Low Wind Scenario



Results of Consequence Modelling Low Wind Scenario

1.0 Pressure Reduction Station Inlet Pipeline (6 inch)

1/1- Consequence Modeling for 1 inch (Pin Hole) Gas Release

The following table no. (A.1) Shows that:

Table (A.1) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 1" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
2 F	UFL	2.2	1.1	0.2 @ 1.4 m
	LFL	6.8	1.3	0.5 @ 4 m
	50 % LFL	13.8	1.65	1.3 @ 8 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
2 F	12	1.6	19	13	0
		4	16	8	0
		9.5	14	5	0
		12.5	13	4	20% /60 sec.
		25	12	2	80.34
		37.5	10	0.5	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)				
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Explosion Overpressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage	
2 F	0.020	14	0.021 bar	Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken
	0.137	3.5	0.137 bar	Some severe injuries, death unlikely
	0.206	3	0.206 bar	Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation



1/2- Consequence Modeling for 3 inch (Half Rup.) Gas Release

The following table no. (A.2) Shows that:

Table (A.2) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 3" / 6" Gas Release

Gas Release (Inlet / PRV "High Pressure")				
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)
2 F	UFL	8.5	1.4	0.8 @ 5 m
	LFL	25.5	0 - 2.4	2.4 @ 16 m
	50 % LFL	37	0 - 3.4	3.4 @ 24 m

Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
2 F	40	1.6	90	70	0
		4	70	45	0
		9.5	57	30	0
		12.5	55	25	20% /60 sec.
		25	47	17	80.34
		37.5	43	12	98.74

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)			
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Explosion Overpressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage
2 F	0.020	52	0.021 bar <i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>
	0.137	12.5	0.137 bar <i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>
	0.206	10	0.206 bar <i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>



1/3- Consequence Modeling for 6 inch (Full Rupture) Gas Release

The following table no. (A.3) Shows that:

Table (A.3) Dispersion Modeling for Inlet - 6" Gas Release

Gas Release					
Wind Category	Flammability Limits	Distance (m)	Height (m)	Cloud Width (m)	
2 F	UFL	12.3	1.6	1.2 @ 7 m	
	LFL	25	0 – 2.7	2.7 @ 16 m	
	50 % LFL	30.5	0 – 3.4	3.4 @ 18 m	
Jet Fire					
Wind Category	Flame Length (m)	Heat Radiation (kW/m ²)	Distance Downwind (m)	Distance Crosswind (m)	Lethality Level (%)
2 F	80	1.6	211	160	0
		4	155	105	0
		9.5	122	70	0
		12.5	117	60	20 %/60 sec.
		25	100	40	80.34
		37.5	90	30	98.74
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion - UVCE (Open Air)					
Wind Category	Pressure Value (bar)	Explosion Overpressure Radius (m)	Overpressure Waves Effect / Damage		
2 F	0.020	130	0.021 bar	<i>Probability of serious damage beyond this point = 0.05 - 10 % glass broken</i>	
	0.137	70	0.137 bar	<i>Some severe injuries, death unlikely</i>	
	0.206	65	0.206 bar	<i>Steel frame buildings distorted / pulled from foundation</i>	